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(i) 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Section 230(c)(2)(B) of the Communications Decen-
cy Act provides immunity from most civil liability to 
computer-service providers for “any action taken to 
enable or make available to * * * others the technical 
means to restrict access to material” that “the pro-
vider or user considers to be * * * objectionable.”  47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).  The court below agreed that none 
of the narrow, express exceptions to that immunity 
in Section 230(e) apply here.  The question presented 
is: 
Whether federal courts can derive an implied ex-
ception to Section 230(c)(2)(B) immunity for blocking 
or filtering decisions when they are alleged to be 
“driven by anticompetitive animus.” 
ii 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Malwarebytes, Inc., petitioner on review, was the 
defendant-appellee below. 
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, respondent on 
review, was the plaintiff-appellant below. 
iii 
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Malwarebytes, Inc. has no parent corporation, and 




U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: 
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Mal-
warebytes, Inc., No. 17-17351 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 
2019) (reported at 946 F.3d 1040) 
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Mal-
warebytes, Inc., No. 17-17351 (9th Cir. Sep. 12, 
2019) (reported at 938 F.3d 1026) (opinion 
withdrawn and superseded on denial of re-
hearing) 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California: 
Enigma Software Group USA LLC v. Mal-
warebytes Inc., No. 5:17-cv-02915-EJD (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 7, 2017) (unreported) 
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IN THE







ENIGMA SOFTWARE GROUP USA, LLC, 
Respondent. 
_________ 
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the  
 United States Court of Appeals  
for the Ninth Circuit 
_________ 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
_________ 
Malwarebytes, Inc., respectfully petitions for a writ 
of certiorari to review the judgment of the Ninth 
Circuit in this case. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The Ninth Circuit’s amended opinion, issued on 
denial of rehearing, is reported at 946 F.3d 1040.  
Pet. App. 1a-29a.  Its original, superseded opinion is 
reported at 938 F.3d 1026.  Pet. App. 30a-56a.  The 
district court’s order granting Malwarebytes’s motion 
to dismiss is unreported.  Id. at 57a-65a. 
JURISDICTION 
The Ninth Circuit entered judgment on September 
12, 2019.  Pet. App. 1a, 30a.  Malwarebytes timely 
2 
petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en 
banc, which were denied on December 31, 2019.  Id. 
at 1a, 4a-5a.  Justice Kagan extended the time to file 
a petition for certiorari to May 11, 2020.  This 
Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
Section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency 
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), provides that: 
 No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of—  
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith 
to restrict access to or availability of material 
that the provider or user considers to be ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively vio-
lent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally 
protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make availa-
ble to information content providers or others 
the technical means to restrict access to materi-
al described in paragraph (1). 
The entirety of Section 230 is reproduced in the 
appendix to this petition, Pet. App. 66a-71a, as is the 
text of Section 230 as it appeared before its 2018 
amendments, id. at 72a-76a. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) is founda-
tional to the Internet as we know it.  Faced with a 
revolutionary new technology, Congress chose a 
system of self-regulation—one that would leave 
users, rather than governments or courts, in control 
3 
of their own experience.  The cornerstone of that 
system is the immunity from civil liability provided 
in Section 230(c).  Through that provision, Congress 
ensured that Internet providers and users would be 
free from the constant threat of litigation for moder-
ating threatening or objectionable content.  Of 
course, that would be impossible without adequate 
tools for screening and filtering content.  Thus, in 
Section 230(c)(2)(B), Congress extended that immun-
ity—without qualification—to providers for “any 
action taken to enable or make available” the “tech-
nical means to restrict access to” content the provider 
“considers to be” objectionable.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).   
Petitioner Malwarebytes, Inc., is a leading software 
security firm that provides filtering tools to consum-
ers.  Its software flags security threats and other 
unwanted programs, and asks users whether they 
wish to retain those programs.  After an update to 
Malwarebytes’s software began flagging Respond-
ent’s products as potentially unwanted programs and 
providing its users the choice to use or to quarantine 
the products, Respondent sued Malwarebytes.  The 
plain text of the Act forbids exactly this kind of 
retaliatory suit.    
In the decision below, however, a divided panel of 
the Ninth Circuit read the Act to contain an implied 
exception for actions allegedly motivated by “anti-
competitive animus.”  To its credit, the court did not 
even try to justify that reading based on the text of 
the statute.  Instead, the court relied exclusively on 
its own mistaken understanding of the policy inter-
ests at stake.   
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This Court’s precedents flatly forbid that approach.  
In recent decades, this Court has instructed lower 
courts that statutory interpretation must be guided, 
first and foremost, by the text, and that even compel-
ling policy considerations cannot justify an interpre-
tation that runs counter to the text.  The decision 
below defies that cardinal rule.  It is therefore no 
surprise that—in both its reasoning and holding—
the decision breaks from decisions of numerous other 
courts.  And the conflict has only gotten worse in the 
short time since the court issued its decision, as a 
California state court has already issued a decision 
expressly disagreeing with it—opening a rift between 
state and federal fora in the technology center of the 
Nation.    
It is critically important for the Court to correct the 
Ninth Circuit’s erroneous interpretation now.  By 
exposing developers of filtering tools to a flood of 
retaliatory litigation, the decision will have the 
opposite effect from Congress’s goal of promoting 
development of such tools.  Making matters worse, 
because the Ninth Circuit relied solely on policy 
considerations that apply to all of Section 230, its 
decision threatens all of Section 230(c)’s immunities.  
It is an open invitation for lower courts to allow a 
lawsuit anytime judges have their own policy con-
cerns about a particular filtering decision or tool.  
The decision below thus risks exposing cybersecurity 
firms, as well as the most popular Internet services, 
to a raft of burdensome litigation for providing the 
filtering tools and exercising the content-moderation 
and editorial discretion that Congress sought to 
encourage.  The result will be an Internet with less 
5 
consumer choice and less protection for users from 
offensive and objectionable content. 
The decision below is a throwback to “a bygone era 
of statutory construction,” when judges looked pri-
marily to ill-defined indicia of congressional intent 
rather than statutory text.  Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus 
Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Court should grant 
certiorari to correct the Ninth Circuit’s “casual 
disregard of the rules of statutory interpretation” 
and bring it back in line with the prevailing interpre-
tations of Section 230.  Id.
The petition should be granted.      
STATEMENT 
A. Statutory Background 
The CDA emerged in 1996 as a response to the 
proliferation of offensive content on the nascent 
Internet.    Congress sought an innovative approach 
for this new technology, one that would let “Govern-
ment * * * get out of the way and let parents and 
individuals” “tailor what [they] see to [their] own 
tastes.”  141 Cong. Rec. 22,045 (1995) (statement of 
Rep. Cox).  The resulting Act therefore aimed “to 
encourage the development of technologies which 
maximize user control over what information is 
received by individuals, families, and schools who 
use the Internet” and “to remove disincentives for 
the development and utilization of blocking and 
filtering technologies.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3), (4).   
Congress identified the threat of litigation as a 
particular obstacle to the development of “blocking 
and filtering technologies.”  See Pet. App. 8a-10a.  
6 
Early state-court decisions had made it challenging 
for Internet-based firms to take action against offen-
sive or dangerous content by exposing those who did 
to liability.  See id. (discussing Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995)).     
The operative text of the CDA took a three-pronged 
approach to eliminating the threat of such litigation. 
First, in subsection (c)(1), Congress addressed im-
munity for hosting third-party content.  It ensured 
that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information 
content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  That provi-
sion bars suits seeking to hold providers liable for 
exercising “a publisher’s traditional editorial func-
tions—such as deciding whether to publish, with-
draw, postpone or alter content.”  Zeran v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).   
Second, in subsection (c)(2)(A), Congress provided 
immunity for those who block or filter content.  
Specifically, it barred civil liability against “provid-
er[s]” and “user[s] of an interactive computer service” 
who take action “to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(2)(A).  That immunity is available for “any 
action,” so long as it is “voluntarily taken in good 
faith.”  Id.
Third—and most relevant here—in subsection 
(c)(2)(B), Congress extended immunity to entities 
that develop and provide the technology necessary 
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for filtering and blocking content.  That immunity 
covers “any action taken to enable or make availa-
ble * * * the technical means to restrict access to” the 
material described in subsection (c)(2)(A), 1 id.
§ 230(c)(2)(B)—that is, “material that the provider or 
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objec-
tionable,” id. § 230(c)(2)(A).  Unlike the immunity for 
those who themselves “restrict access to or availabil-
ity of” such material, the immunity for developers of 
filtering technology is not conditioned on “good 
faith.”  Compare id. (emphasis added), with id.
§ 230(c)(2)(B).   
Congress also provided a handful of exceptions to 
the CDA’s immunity, including with respect to 
intellectual property laws and communications 
privacy laws.  See, e.g., id. § 230(e)(2), (4).  None of 
those exceptions refers to antitrust law or “anticom-
petitive” behavior.  See id. § 230(e).
B. Procedural Background 
1. Malwarebytes is an Internet security firm with 
an international customer base.  Pet. App. 12a.  
Users download its software to protect themselves 
from a wide array of threats on the Internet.  These 
include “malware,” which can damage operating 
systems or steal user information, and “Potentially 
Unwanted Programs” (or “PUPs”) that falsely de-
1 As enacted, the text cross-references subsection (c)(1), see 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B), but that is uniformly regarded as a 
scrivener’s error, see Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 
F.3d 1169, 1173 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009).     
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ceive users into thinking something is wrong with 
their computer so that they will download paid 
products to combat the supposed threats.  See id.
When Malwarebytes’s “software detects an unwanted 
program, it displays a notification and asks the user 
if she wants to remove the program from her com-
puter.”  Id. at 58a.  In other words, users make the 
final decision about what gets filtered.   
In October 2016, Malwarebytes adopted new crite-
ria for identifying a PUP.  Id. at 12a-13a.  Using 
those criteria, Malwarebytes’s software began classi-
fying certain products of Respondent Enigma Soft-
ware Group as a PUP.  Id.  As with any PUP, Mal-
warebytes’ software gave users the option to retain, 
quarantine, or remove Enigma’s products.  Id. at 
12a-13a, 58a.   
2. Enigma sued Malwarebytes, alleging state-law 
business torts and unfair advertising in violation of 
the Lanham Act.  Id. at 58a-59a.  Malwarebytes 
moved to dismiss, invoking Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s 
immunity for providers of filtering software.  Id. at 
14a.  Enigma opposed the motion, claiming “that 
Malwarebytes blocked Enigma’s programs for anti-
competitive reasons” and that the CDA’s immunity is 
unavailable under such circumstances.  Id. at 19a.     
The District Court granted Malwarebytes’s motion.  
Id. at 65a.  It held that “the plain language of the 
statute” requires only that “the provider or user 
consider[ ]” the filtered material “objectionable.”  Id.
at 62a (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)).  Thus, it was 
irrelevant why Malwarebytes considered Enigma’s 
products “objectionable.”  See id.  The court noted 
that the neighboring provision addressing immunity 
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for those who actually “restrict access” to content 
“include[s] a good-faith requirement.”  See id. at 63a 
(discussing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)).  Because Con-
gress “chose not to” “include[ ] a similar reference” to 
good faith in subsection (c)(2)(B), the court declined 
to find a similar exception implied there.  Id.
3. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.  
Id. at 27a.  Looking to the “history and purpose” of 
the CDA, id. at 19a, the majority held that Section 
230(c)(2)’s immunity provisions contain an unstated 
exception for “decisions that are driven by anticom-
petitive animus,” id. at 11a.  Although the court 
acknowledged that its reading was in tension with 
“the unwillingness of Congress to spell out the mean-
ing of ‘otherwise objectionable,’ ” it felt obliged to 
update the statute for “today” by reading it not “to 
give providers unbridled discretion to block online 
content.”  Id. at 20a.  Although the court did not 
explain how its reading was compatible with the 
operative text of the statute or the ordinary meaning 
of the word “objectionable,” it found support for its 
reading in “the statute’s express policies.”  Id. at 20a-
21a.2
Judge Rawlinson dissented.  The majority’s read-
ing, she explained, “cannot be squared with the 
broad language of the Act.”  Id. at 29a.  “Under the 
language of the statute, if the blocked content is 
2 Separately, the court rejected Enigma’s argument that its 
Lanham Act false-advertising claim falls within the CDA’s 
exception for “intellectual property” law.  Pet. App. 23a-27a.  
Malwarebytes does not seek review of this issue.          
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‘otherwise objectionable’ to the provider, the Act 
bestows immunity.”  Id. (quoting Zango, 568 F.3d at 
1173).  “The majority’s real complaint,” the dissent 
pointed out, “is not that the district court construed 
the statute too broadly, but that the statute is writ-
ten too broadly.”  Id. at 28a.  Such an issue “is one 
beyond [judicial] authority to correct.”  Id.
Over Judge Rawlinson’s dissent, the Ninth Circuit 
denied Malwarebytes’s petition for rehearing and 
rehearing en banc.  Id. at 4a-5a.3  This timely peti-
tion followed.        
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
I. THE DECISION BELOW DEFIES THIS 
COURT’S BASIC RULES OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION AND DEVIATES FROM 
COURTS’ SETTLED UNDERSTANDINGS OF 
SECTION 230. 
One of this Court’s most fundamental precepts is 
that statutory interpretation must begin with the 
text—and end there when the text is clear.  This 
Court has repeatedly granted certiorari to clarify 
that principle.  See, e.g., Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S. Ct. 
at 2364 (“We cannot approve such a casual disregard 
of the rules of statutory interpretation.”).        
3 The panel issued an amended opinion that modified a sen-
tence suggesting that immunity would be unavailable anytime a 
decision was motivated by “the identity of the entity that 
produced” the filtered content.  Compare Pet. App. 39a, with id.
at 11a-12a.  It made no other changes.         
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The Ninth Circuit flouted that rule in this case.  
The court never explained how its reading bears any 
relationship to the operative text of the statute.  
Instead, it relied exclusively on its own policy con-
cerns (which were themselves questionable).  Unsur-
prisingly, that fundamentally flawed approach led 
the court to the wrong outcome in this case. 
Not only did the Ninth Circuit’s approach defy this 
Court’s precedent, it upended the widely-shared 
consensus among lower courts that Section 230’s 
immunity provisions should be read broadly.  The 
court also broke from the D.C. Circuit by using the 
CDA’s prefatory statutory goals to override its opera-
tive text, and the resulting interpretation of subsec-
tion (c)(2)(B) has been flatly rejected by state courts 
in the very same State where this litigation arose, 
California.  These conflicts on an issue of critical 
importance further counsel this Court’s intervention. 
A. The Decision Below Erroneously Relied On 
Policy Rather Than Text To Interpret Sec-
tion 230.   
1. “[I]n any statutory construction case,” a court 
must “start, of course, with the statutory text.”  
Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (quoting 
BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006)).  
This Court’s cases insisting on that approach are 
legion.  See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 
U.S. 438, 461-462 (2002) (“We have stated time and 
again that courts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a 
statute what it says there.”). 
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“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, 
then, this first canon is also the last:  judicial inquiry 
is complete.”  Id. at 462 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  A statute’s text is not “ambiguous” merely 
because it uses “[b]road general language.”  Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980).  Only after 
examining “the text of the provision in question” and 
discerning a genuine ambiguity may a court “move 
on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the 
Act in which it occurs.”  N.Y. State Conference of Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645, 655 (1995); accord Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S. 
Ct. at 2364 (finding it “inappropriate[ ]” to “resort to 
legislative history before consulting [a] statute’s text 
and structure”).  Courts “[l]ack[ ] the expertise or 
authority to assess the[ ] important competing 
claims” involved in policy disputes, which are “best 
addressed to the Congress.”  Dunn v. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 480 (1997).  
And, critically, “[p]olicy considerations cannot over-
ride [an] interpretation of the text and structure of 
[an] Act.”  Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Inter-
state Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994).    
2. The Ninth Circuit broke sharply from this meth-
od of statutory interpretation.  It started with its 
view of the statute’s “history and purpose,” not text.  
Pet. App. 19a.  Indeed, the court apparently recog-
nized that its approach was incompatible with Sec-
tion 230’s text:  It took note of Congress’s “unwilling-
ness * * * to spell out the meaning of ‘otherwise 
objectionable,’ ” and acknowledged that the text 
confers a “broad grant of protective control” to Inter-
net providers.  Id. at 20a.           
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Although the court linked its reading of the statute 
to the word “objectionable,” id. at 23a, that relation-
ship was not based on the “ordinary * * * meaning” of 
the term, as this Court’s cases require, Wisconsin 
Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 
(2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
Ninth Circuit did not, for example, consider a defini-
tion of the term, or examine its meaning in other 
contexts.  Instead, the court relied exclusively on two 
judges’ perspective of the underlying policy interests.  
Pet. App. 20a (expressing concern that “[u]sers would 
not reasonably anticipate providers blocking valua-
ble online content”).  In fact, the court properly 
rejected Enigma’s only argument based on the mean-
ing of the word “objectionable.”  See id. at 21a (refus-
ing to apply ejusdem generis to narrow the meaning 
of “objectionable” given the “breadth of the term” and 
the lack of similarity among subsection (c)(2)’s “enu-
merated categories”).   
By reading an unstated exception into the Act, the 
Ninth Circuit ignored a tried-and-true canon of 
textual analysis.  “Where Congress includes particu-
lar language in one section of a statute but omits it 
in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”  
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) 
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).  
Here, Congress included a “good faith” requirement 
to claim immunity under subsection (c)(2)(A).  The 
absence of any similar language indicates the “inten-
tional[ ] * * * exclusion” of any similar motive-based 
requirement for subsection (c)(2)(B)’s immunity.  
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Malwarebytes made this point in its appellate brief, 
Malwarebytes C.A. Answering Br. 29-30, and rehear-
ing petition, C.A. Reh’g Pet. 11-12.  Yet the panel 
majority failed to even acknowledge it.       
The court’s sole justification for bypassing all of 
these bedrock rules of construction was policy.  Pet. 
App. 19a-21a.  Under this Court’s precedent, that is 
no justification at all.  Courts have “no roving li-
cense, in even ordinary cases of statutory interpreta-
tion, to disregard clear language simply on the view 
that * * * Congress ‘must have intended’ something” 
else.  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 
782, 794 (2014); see also Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. 
Fossil Grp., Inc., __ S. Ct. __, slip op. at 7 (2020) 
(“[T]he place for reconciling competing and incom-
mensurable policy goals * * * is before policymak-
ers.”).  The Ninth Circuit suggested that its empha-
sis on policy might be justified by Congress’s inclu-
sion of policy statements in the CDA.  See Pet. App. 
11a, 20a-21a.  Wrong again.  Congressional findings 
are too “thin” a “reed upon which to base” an excep-
tion for “motive” that is “neither expressed nor * * * 
fairly implied in the operative sections of the Act.”  
Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 
260 (1994).    
Making matters worse, the policy concern animat-
ing the majority was wholly unfounded.  The panel 
feared that users would lose access to “valuable 
online content” because providers might “act for their 
own, and not the public, benefit.”  Pet. App. 20a.  But 
Congress anticipated this very issue.  This case 
concerns immunity under subsection (c)(2)(B), which 
applies only to entities that empower others to filter 
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content by supplying the “technical means” to do so.  
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B).  The majority’s concern is 
directed to those who “restrict access to or availabil-
ity of material” under subsection (c)(2)(A), and that 
immunity is available only to those who act “in good 
faith.”  Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).4  The majority’s apparent 
confusion about this elementary issue only reinforces 
this Court’s longstanding position that courts are “ill 
suited” “to make * * * policy judgments.”  Perry v. 
Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 393 (2012) (per curiam); see also 
infra pp. 21-29 (explaining why Malwarebytes’s 
position better comports with Congress’s stated 
policies to promote competition and user choice).   
3. The Ninth Circuit’s deeply flawed approach to 
statutory construction led it to an erroneous result.  
Under a plain-meaning analysis of Section 230’s 
“broad language,” Pet. App. 29a (Rawlinson, J., 
dissenting), Malwarebytes is entitled to immunity 
under subsection (c)(2)(B). 
That provision immunizes (1) a “provider or user of 
an interactive computer service” that (2) offers to 
“others the technical means to restrict access to 
material” that (3) “the provider or user consid-
ers * * * harassing[ ] or otherwise objectionable.”  47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).  Only the third element was 
contested here, which makes sense: Malwarebytes’s 
software is plainly an interactive computer service, 
4 Because Malwarebytes only claims immunity under subsec-
tion (c)(2)(B), Malwarebytes takes no position on whether the 
conduct alleged by Enigma in this case would fall short of the 
“good faith” required by subsection (c)(2)(A).     
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and it operates by giving users the “technical 
means,” id. § 230(c)(2)(B), “to remove [a flagged] 
program from her computer,” Pet. App. 58a.   
That leaves only whether Enigma’s products are 
“material that the provider” (here, Malwarebytes) 
“considers to be * * * objectionable.”  47 U.S.C.  
§ 230(c)(2)(A).  Enigma’s complaint answers that 
question in the affirmative by conceding that Mal-
warebytes considers Enigma’s products “PUPs and 
‘threats.’ ”  C.A. E.R. 24.  Because the Act requires 
only that Malwarebytes “considers” the content to be 
“objectionable,” that determination is sufficient for 
immunity to apply.  The “ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning,” Wisconsin Cent., 138 S. Ct. at 
2074 (internal quotation marks omitted), of “objec-
tionable” is easily capacious enough to encompass 
programs that Malwarebytes has deemed a “threat” 
or a “potentially unwanted program.”  See, e.g., 
Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1995 ed.) 
(defining “objectionable” as “[p]rovoking disapproval 
or opposition: offensive”); The American Heritage 
College Dictionary (3d ed. 1993) (similar definition).  
Section 230(c)’s caption reinforces that reading.  See
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 539-540 (2015) 
(plurality op.).  It clarifies the provision is meant to 
protect “blocking and screening of offensive materi-
al,” even though the word “offensive” is not one of the 
enumerated categories in § 230(c)(2)’s list.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c) (emphasis added). 
Because the Ninth Circuit only reached a contrary 
decision by disregarding this Court’s rules for statu-
tory interpretation, this Court’s review is warranted.  
See Sup. Ct. R. 10(c).  Allowing the decision below to 
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stand will embolden lower courts to carve out addi-
tional policy-driven exceptions to Congress’s duly-
enacted legislation.  See infra pp. 31-35.   
B. The Decision Below Splits From The Ap-
proach Of Numerous Other Courts.   
Given how starkly the decision below deviates from 
this Court’s precedents, it is no surprise that it 
renders the Ninth Circuit an outlier on Section 230 
immunity.   
1. Outside of the Ninth Circuit, courts are in 
agreement that Section 230’s immunity provisions 
must be read expansively.  As the Seventh Circuit 
has explained, that conclusion flows from Congress’s 
choice to use broad language:  “[T]he reason a legis-
lature writes a general statute is to avoid any need 
to traipse through the United States Code” and state 
lawbooks to “consider all potential sources of liabil-
ity, one at a time.”  Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for 
Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008).  Courts have widely 
honored that choice in the context of Section 230.  
Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 
18 (1st Cir. 2016) (“There has been near-universal 
agreement that section 230 should not be construed 
grudgingly.”); Force v. Facebook, 934 F.3d 53, 64 (2d 
Cir. 2019) (noting “general agreement” that the CDA 
“should be construed broadly in favor of immunity”), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 19-859 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2020); 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (referring to “§ 230’s broad 
immunity”); Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776, 788 (Cal. 
2018) (plurality op.) (“the tools of statutory interpre-
tation compel[ ] a broad construction of section 230”); 
Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 
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1011, 1016 (N.Y. 2011) (“Both state and federal 
courts around the country have generally interpreted 
Section 230 immunity broadly * * * .” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); accord Doe v. MySpace, 
Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); Johnson v. 
Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010); Almeida v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 
2006); Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, 
LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2019).5
The decision below, however, takes the opposite 
approach.  Motivated by policy concerns, it discerned 
“limitations in the scope of immunity” found nowhere 
in the Act’s text.  Pet. App. 18a.  The Ninth Circuit 
therefore eschewed the broad reading of Section 230 
adopted by other courts.  And this is not the first 
time that the Ninth Circuit has resorted to policy 
arguments to give the CDA a narrow construction.  
See Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851-
853 (9th Cir. 2016) (reading the Act to have a “nar-
row language and * * * purpose”).  This decision 
cements the court’s outlier status.              
2.  The decision below also places the Ninth Circuit 
in square conflict with the D.C. Circuit regarding the 
proper relationship of Section 230’s express policy 
goals, see 47 U.S.C. § 230(b), with its operative text, 
see id. § 230(c)-(e).  The panel repeatedly—and 
selectively—resorted to subsection (b)’s policy goals 
5 Although some of these decisions speak specifically in terms of 
subsection (c)(1), that merely reflects the facts of those cases.  
Nothing in the opinions’ reasoning suggests the broad reading 
is limited to that subsection.     
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to justify its atextual approach to statutory construc-
tion.  See Pet. App. 20a-21a (citing 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(b)(3), (4)). 
The D.C. Circuit has rejected that analytical ap-
proach.  In Comcast Corp. v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the 
FCC argued that it possessed regulatory power over 
“an Internet service provider’s network management 
practices.”  Id. at 644.  Lacking any “express statuto-
ry authority over such practices,” id., the Commis-
sion turned to the policy goals enacted in subsection 
(b) of the CDA, claiming those goals could “anchor 
the exercise of [regulatory] authority” even without 
an express grant of power.  Id. at 652.  The D.C. 
Circuit rejected that argument, holding that “state-
ments of policy, by themselves, do not create ‘statu-
torily mandated responsibilities.’ ” Id. at 644.  The 
alternative approach, the court explained, would 
“virtually free the Commission from its congressional 
tether.”  Id. at 655.  The D.C. Circuit’s approach is 
flatly at odds with Enigma’s efforts to carve out an 
exception to the “statutorily mandated” immunity by 
relying on the CDA’s “policy statements alone.”  Id.
at 644, 654 (internal quotation marks omitted).        
3. In near-record time, the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
has provoked disagreement with a California state 
court.  Just a few weeks after the panel issued its 
original decision, the California Superior Court 
issued an opinion “disagree[ing]” with the panel’s 
approach, finding that it “ignore[d] the plain lan-
guage of the statute by reading a good faith limita-
tion into section 230(c)(2)(B).”  Prager Univ. v. Google 
LLC, No. 19CV340667, 2019 WL 8640569, at *10 
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(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 
H047714 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2019).  That holding 
led the court to reject a video-maker’s claim that 
YouTube acted in bad faith by allowing users—such 
as parents, school administrators, or libraries—to 
enable a “Restricted Mode” that filters certain sensi-
tive content, such as graphic violence and sexual 
material.  Id. at *2, *4, *9-10.        
Existing California precedent concerning Section 
230 assures that decision will be affirmed.  The 
California Court of Appeal has already held, in a 
different case, that “Section 230 imposes a subjective 
element into the [immunity] determination” by 
conferring immunity “so long as [the developer of the 
filter] deemed the material to be * * * objectionable.”  
Pallorium, Inc. v. Jared, No. G036124, 2007 WL 
80955, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2007) (emphasis 
added and internal quotation marks omtited).  And 
that reading comports with the California Supreme 
Court’s instruction to interpret Section 230 “literally” 
according to its text.  Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 
510, 529 (Cal. 2006).  Thus, there is nothing to be 
gained by postponing consideration of the question 
presented.  Delay would also be harmful given the 
high risk of forum shopping:  Because California is 
located within the Ninth Circuit—and home to the 
Nation’s hub of technological development—plaintiffs 
now have every incentive to bring suit in federal 
courts.  Certiorari is necessary to eliminate that risk.   
II. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS OF 
SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE. 
Even if the CDA’s text left any ambiguity to be 
resolved by reference to policy, the Ninth Circuit 
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profoundly misunderstood how those considerations 
apply to this case.  In fact, the decision below un-
dermines Congress’s stated goals in enacting the 
CDA.  It is therefore vital for the Court to address 
the question presented now.  Otherwise, this inter-
pretation will fester—and in the circuit where Sec-
tion 230 matters the most.     
Congress’s central goal in enacting Section 230 was 
to promote a vibrant marketplace to give users tools 
to provide a safe Internet experience for themselves 
and their families, without interference by state and 
federal regulation.  By allowing plaintiffs to under-
mine the immunity granted by Section 230(c)(2)(B) 
and subjecting filtering-tool providers to prolonged 
and costly litigation, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
accomplishes the opposite by interposing courts as 
regulators between Internet users and their choice of 
filtering tools. 
Worse still, there is no logical limit to the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning.  Its ruling invites judges to chip 
away at all of Section 230(c)’s immunities, including 
the oft-invoked immunity of 230(c)(1) that protects 
websites from liability for third-party content.  And 
because the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is rooted in 
policy considerations unmoored from specific statuto-
ry text, it invites courts to impose additional policy-
driven exceptions beyond the competition context.   
A. The Decision Below Threatens The User 
Choice And Internet Security Goals That 
Motivated Section 230(c)(2)(B). 
1. Congress’s goal in enacting Section 230, and 
especially 230(c)(2)(B), was to put Internet users in 
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the driver’s seat of their own online experience by 
allowing them to choose the filtering tools that best 
fit their needs without government interference.  
Congress recognized that services such as Malware-
bytes’s “offer users a great degree of control over the 
information that they receive, as well as the poten-
tial for even greater control in the future as technol-
ogy develops,” and that the “Internet and other 
interactive computer services have flourished, to the 
benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of govern-
ment regulation.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2), (4).  Con-
gress thus declared that “the policy of the United 
States” is “to preserve the vibrant and competitive 
free market that presently exists for the Inter-
net * * *, unfettered by Federal or State regulation”; 
“to encourage the development of technologies which 
maximize user control over what information is 
received”; and “to remove disincentives for the devel-
opment and utilization of blocking and filtering 
technologies.”  Id. § 230(b)(2)-(4).  As one of the bill’s 
co-sponsors, Representative Chris Cox, explained, 
“every one of us will be able to tailor what we see to 
our own tastes” based on Section 230’s promotion of a 
vibrant free market in filtering technology.  141 
Cong. Rec. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).  In 
fact, Section 230 was introduced as a user-driven 
alternative to a bill that sought to combat offensive 
content through top-down government regulation.  
See Pet. App. 9a-11a.6
6 Both provisions were enacted, but Section 230’s government-
regulation-based rival was largely invalidated by this Court for 
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As Judge Wilkinson put it in the first major circuit 
court decision on Section 230—since widely adopted 
by other courts—Congress created a “broad immuni-
ty” “to encourage service providers to self-regulate 
the dissemination of offensive material.”  Zeran, 129 
F.3d at 331; accord Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 29 
(“Congress did not sound an uncertain trumpet when 
it enacted the CDA, and it chose to grant broad 
protections * * * .  Showing that a website operates 
through a meretricious business model is not enough 
to strip away those protections.”).  Part of Congress’s 
motivation was to overrule a New York state court 
opinion, under which “computer service providers 
who regulated the dissemination of offensive materi-
al on their services risked subjecting themselves to 
liability, because such regulation cast the service 
provider in the role of a publisher.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d 
at 331 (discussing Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 
323710); see also Pet. App. 9a-10a; H.R. Conf. Rep. 
No. 104-458, at 194 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 208. The statutory findings, policy 
statements, and legislative history thus all indicate a 
desire to let the market, and not courts, decide how 
content should be filtered. 
But the Ninth Circuit’s decision upsets the immun-
ity that Congress created to achieve that goal.  In 
place of the “broad immunity” prescribed by Con-
gress, the Ninth Circuit has authorized courts to 
abrogate immunity for filtering decisions that, in the 
violating the First Amendment.  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844, 877-879 (1997). 
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court’s opinion, Congress would not have wanted to 
protect.  See Pet. App. 22a.  Under that reasoning, 
any plaintiff can potentially convince a court to craft 
an exception for a particular set of facts or alleged 
motivation, thereby exposing the defendant to the 
whole panoply of state and federal statutory and 
common law causes of action that Congress sought to 
preempt.  See id. at 13a-14a.  So much for providers 
of filtering tools being “unfettered by Federal or 
State regulation.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). 
2. The possibility that a defendant will ultimately 
prove that it acted with motives a court would con-
sider pure is little comfort.  Congress created an 
immunity from suit precisely because, as Judge 
Wilkinson observed, it “recognized the threat that 
tort-based lawsuits pose” and so enacted Section 230 
“to maintain the robust nature of Internet communi-
cation and, accordingly, to keep government interfer-
ence in the medium to a minimum.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d 
at 330.  As the same court later elaborated, “immuni-
ty is an immunity from suit rather than a mere 
defense to liability and it is effectively lost if a case is 
erroneously permitted to go to trial.”  Nemet Chevro-
let, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 
254 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  For that reason, “Section 230 immunity” should 
be “accorded effect at the first logical point in the 
litigation process.”  Id.  In other contexts, this Court 
has recognized that immunities are not “merely * * * 
a defense to monetary liability,” but rather “an 
immunity from suit” altogether, Fed. Mar. Comm’n
v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 766 (2002) 
(sovereign immunity), and “an entitlement not to 
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stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,” 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (quali-
fied immunity). 
If not afforded immunity from suit altogether, In-
ternet services will “face death by ten thousand 
duck-bites.” Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  That is why “section 230 
must be interpreted to protect websites not merely 
from ultimate liability, but from having to fight 
costly and protracted legal battles.”  Id. at 1175. 
The danger of abusive litigation in this area is no 
idle threat.  That is because litigious malware pur-
veyors can easily use the exception recognized by the 
Ninth Circuit to plead around Section 230(c)(2)(B) at 
the motion-to-dismiss stage.  The decision below 
exacerbates that problem by setting a low bar for 
what a putative competitor must allege.  See Pet. 
App. 23a (accepting Enigma’s claims of “anticompeti-
tive” behavior without enumerating specific facts). 
It is not difficult for a purveyor of malware to 
brand themselves as an anti-malware provider by 
combining purported security features with objec-
tionable material.  For example, in an earlier Ninth 
Circuit case, the plaintiff combined a supposed 
“[s]pam [b]locker” with noxious adware that bom-
barded users with pop-up ads.  Zango, 568 F.3d at 
1170.  After the decision below, any purveyor of 
malware and adware now has a playbook to over-
come Section 230(c)(2)(B) simply by adding a pur-
ported security feature to their obnoxious software. 
Even if the text of Section 230(c)(2)(B) gave courts 
license to second-guess the motivations for internet-
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security firms’ classification decisions, judges would 
be poorly positioned to do so.  There are numerous 
valid reasons Internet-security firms may flag puta-
tively competitive software as a threat.  Even well-
known brands have had security vulnerabilities or 
unexpectedly caused computers to slow down,7 which 
could justify a potentially-unwanted-program label.  
More pernicious is fake antivirus software, a com-
mon problem that has been a target of government 
enforcement.  Examples include a $163 million 
judgment the FTC obtained against an outfit that 
sold “scareware” to “trick consumers into thinking 
their computers were infected with malicious soft-
ware, and then sold them software to ‘fix’ their non-
existent problem”8; as well as a $35 million settle-
ment with the well-known retailer Office Depot for 
marketing similar “scamware” that “tricked custom-
ers into buying millions of dollars’ worth of computer 
repair and technical services by deceptively claiming 
their software had found malware symptoms on the 
customers’ computers.”9  These firms could write a 
7 See, e.g., Eric Griffith, How to Rid a New PC of Crapware, 
PCMag (Apr. 1, 2020), https://bit.ly/3ch9BMM (explaining that 
a well-known antivirus program is “likely to slow [a user’s] 
PC”). 
8 Press Release, FTC, FTC Case Results in $163 Million Judg-
ment Against “Scareware” Marketer (Oct. 2, 2012), 
https://bit.ly/3bjkJIx. 
9 Press Release, FTC, Office Depot and Tech Support Firm Will 
Pay $35 Million to Settle FTC Allegations That They Tricked 
Consumers into Buying Costly Computer Repair Services (Mar. 
27, 2019), https://bit.ly/3afWpWH. 
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self-serving complaint like Enigma’s to circumvent 
Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s immunity for cybersecurity 
firms that seek to protect consumers from these 
threats. 
3. Congress instead intended consumers and their 
cybersecurity providers to evaluate Internet threats 
for themselves.  By inviting courts to interpose 
themselves between consumers and cybersecurity 
services, the Ninth Circuit’s decision threatens 
consumer choice and Internet security. 
Purported “competitors” may in fact be legitimate 
threats to Internet users.  See supra p. 26 & n.8.  
Moreover, with millions of potential threats on the 
Internet, it is impossible for filtering-software com-
panies to individually analyze every potential danger 
to users.  As the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(EFF) and CAUCE North America, Inc. explained 
below, filtering software requires the use of auto-
mated algorithms to predict threats, which may 
sometimes flag potentially competitive software.  
EFF et al. C.A. Amicus Br. 9-10; see also ESET, LLC 
C.A. Amicus Br. 7-8 (explaining that Malwarebytes’s 
competitor ESET “encounter[s] more than 300,000 
new unique and suspicious objects every day” and 
that “it is not possible to sort through threats and 
other objectionable programs one by one and give 
deference to those that might plausibly claim to be 
competitors”). 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision puts cybersecurity 
firms in a predicament.  They can try their best to 
protect consumers against all threats, knowing that 
they will subject themselves to expensive lawsuits 
when they designate an alleged competitor as a 
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threat—either forcing them out of business or raising 
prices for consumers.  Or they can avoid liability by 
taking a more permissive stance, exposing customers 
to threats.  In either case, consumers end up with an 
inferior Internet experience.  And facing such a 
choice, new firms may be dissuaded from entering 
the cybersecurity market altogether—exactly the 
opposite of what Congress wanted.   
There is no need for those dire results.  Section 230 
has worked just as Congress intended to promote 
competition in filtering technology.  Enigma’s own 
complaint identified over 40 competing cybersecurity 
companies.  C.A. E.R. 39. 10   The Ninth Circuit’s 
justification for its policy-driven exception to Section 
230(c)(2)(B) was a fear that such firms would “act for 
their own, and not the public, benefit” by adopting 
“filtering practices aimed at suppressing competition, 
rather than protecting internet users.”  Pet. App. 
20a.  In the “vibrant and competitive free market 
that presently exists * * * unfettered by Federal or 
State regulation,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2), however, 
such a strategy would surely backfire.  The reputa-
tional damage from self-serving filtering decisions 
would outweigh the benefits of dissuading a few 
10 This shows how unfounded the Ninth Circuit’s competition 
concerns are in this market.  In the antitrust context, such a 
competitive market would lead to prompt dismissal of any claim 
that a company had monopoly power.  See, e.g., Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (giving 
examples of “nearly 100%,” “80% to 95%,” “87%,” and “over two-
thirds” as examples of market shares that could support a 
monopolization claim). 
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customers from trying a competitor’s product.  And if 
a customer does find that her cybersecurity provider 
is not acting in her interest, she has dozens of alter-
natives to choose from. 
B. The Decision Below Will Undermine Other 
Tools That Help Internet Users Curate 
Their Own Online Experience. 
The fallout of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling will not be 
limited to cybersecurity software.  Numerous online 
services—including tools offered by many of the most 
commonly used Internet products—are protected by 
Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s immunity. The Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, if allowed to stand, will invite lawsuits 
against these companies’ filtering decisions with 
ginned-up allegations of anticompetitive motives. 
For example, Facebook gives users tools to hide or 
block content posted by others on their personal 
Facebook page and has successfully invoked Section 
230(c)(2)(B) to defend those tools.11  YouTube offers 
users “Restricted Mode”: “an optional setting that 
you can use on YouTube to help screen out potential-
ly mature content that you may prefer not to see or 
don’t want others using your device to see.”12  Like-
wise, Twitter offers users a “quality filter” that 
allows them to “filter[ ] lower-quality content from 
[their] notifications,”  and it gives users tools to limit 
11 Fehrenbach v. Zeldin, No. 17-CV-5282 (JFB) (ARL), 2018 WL 
4242452, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018), report and recommen-
dation adopted, 2018 WL 4242453 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2018). 
12 YouTube Help, Disable or enable Restricted Mode, Google, 
https://bit.ly/2KftqaQ (last visited May 11, 2020). 
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who can send them direct messages and to screen 
messages with “potentially sensitive” content. 13
Popular message-board website Reddit’s entire 
content-moderation program relies on “[v]olunteer 
community moderators” who use Reddit-provided 
tools “to remove any post that does not follow their 
community’s rules, without any involvement or 
direction from Reddit, Inc.” 14
These are all examples of tools that make the In-
ternet a safer and more pleasant place for consum-
ers.  They are just the types of “action taken to 
enable * * * the technical means to restrict access to 
material” that Section 230(c)(2)(B) was meant to 
immunize.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B). 
Yet under the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Section 
230(c)(2)(B) would no longer provide the kind of 
absolute immunity Congress intended “to encourage 
the development of technologies which maximize 
user control.”  Id. § 230(b)(3).  Rather, plaintiffs 
whose content is flagged by these tools may write 
themselves an exception to Section 230(c)(2)(B) by 
alleging that YouTube or Reddit or Twitter acted 
with anticompetitive animus towards their content.  
Indeed, that is exactly what the plaintiff alleged in 
13 About the Notifications timeline, Twitter, 
https://bit.ly/3eu7VRv (last visited May 11, 2020); About Direct 
Messages, Twitter, https://bit.ly/3bldCQ2 (last visited May 11, 
2020). 
14 Transparency Report 2019, Reddit, https://bit.ly/2ysFhj9 (last 
visited May 11, 2020) (showing that most removals are by user-
moderators using Reddit-provided tools). 
31 
Prager, supra pp. 19-20, the decision that expressly 
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s holding here. 
C. The Decision Below Endangers All Of Sec-
tion 230’s Important Immunities. 
The logic of the Ninth Circuit’s decision also ap-
plies naturally to the rest of Section 230(c)’s immuni-
ties and will give courts license to imply additional 
exceptions beyond one for anticompetitive animus.  
The opinion’s reasoning thus invites replacing the 
“broad immunity” that “Congress enacted,” Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 331, with an unpredictable quasi-
immunity riddled with holes derived from judicial 
policy preferences. 
1. Most obviously, any exception read into Section 
230(c)(2)(B) would almost certainly apply to Section 
230(c)(2)(A).  After all, the “material” to which sub-
section (c)(2)(B) applies merely incorporates subsec-
tion (c)(2)(A)’s list by reference.  Moreover, because 
subsection (c)(2)(A) has the “good faith” condition 
that (c)(2)(B) lacks, see supra pp. 14-15, any excep-
tion read into (c)(2)(B) would apply even more readily 
to (c)(2)(A). 
But subsection (c)(2)(A) is crucial to what Congress 
intended when it enacted subsection (c) as a 
“[p]rotection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and 
screening of offensive material.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c).  
As Judge Easterbook has explained, Section 230(c)(2) 
accomplishes that goal by working as a “safety net”; 
a “web host that * * * filter[s] out offensive material 
is not liable to the censored customer,” thereby 
“induc[ing] web hosts * * * to take more care to 
protect the privacy and sensibilities of third parties.”  
Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659-660 (7th Cir. 
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2003).  That goal is understandable:  An Internet 
where services like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter 
could not screen graphically violent and sexual 
content for fear of facing massive litigation costs 
would be a scary place. 
Yet the Ninth Circuit’s insertion of atextual excep-
tions into Section 230(c)(2) will discourage modera-
tion and restore the legal regime Congress intended 
to overturn with Section 230, in which content mod-
eration creates liability.  See supra p. 23.  “Content 
moderation at scale is impossible to do well” because 
of the sheer complexity: services like Facebook 
receive hundreds of millions of uploads every day, 
requiring imperfect mass-automated moderation 
supported by thousands of human judgment calls.15
Predictably, most anyone whose content is restricted 
will be upset.  Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, 
so long as that person can come up with plausible 
allegations that the web service restricted the con-
tent in order to favor some competing content, the 
defendant will be unable to successfully invoke 
Section 230(c)(2) immunity at the motion-to-dismiss 
stage.  Knowing that Section 230(c)(2) will offer only 
modest protection against litigious content-providers, 
interactive computer services will have a tremendous 
15  Mike Masnick, Masnick’s Impossibility Theorem: Content 
Moderation At Scale Is Impossible To Do Well, TechDirt (Nov. 
20, 2019), https://bit.ly/2z1XpRh; see Kate Klonick, The New 
Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1635-48 (2018) (describing 
Facebook’s multi-tiered, highly-complex moderation system). 
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incentive to scale back content moderation—exactly 
the opposite of the outcome Congress intended. 
For example, Facebook’s Community Standards 
include the platform’s restrictions on hate speech, 
violent and graphic content, nudity and sexual 
activity, and sexual solicitation—all under the head-
ing of “Objectionable Content.”16  That is the exact 
term used in Section 230(c)(2)’s catch-all provision.  
If courts fashion carve-outs to Section 230(c)(2) 
immunity for restricting “objectionable” content, 
purveyors of the most unpleasant software and 
material could fashion an exception for themselves. 
2. The decision below also risks infecting the 
neighboring immunity in Section 230(c)(1).  Whereas 
subsection (c)(2) immunizes actions to restrict or 
take down content, subsection (c)(1) immunizes the 
decision to leave up third-party content.  Because the 
Ninth Circuit’s purposive reasoning was not tethered 
to any text in (c)(2) and implied an exception from 
the findings and policy statements that apply to all 
of Section 230, there is nothing stopping plaintiffs 
from asking courts to fashion the same exception for 
(c)(1). 
Subsection (c)(1) has been credited by many as 
having “[c]reated the Internet” as we know it today.  
See, e.g., Jeff Kosseff, The Twenty-Six Words That 
Created the Internet 4 (2019) (explaining that nine 
of the ten most popular websites in the United States 
16 Community Standards: Part III. Objectionable Content, 
Facebook, https://bit.ly/2KgiUAq (last visited May 11, 2020) 
(emphasis added). 
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principally publish third-party content and so rely on 
Section 230(c)(1)).  The vibrant Internet we know 
will be imperiled when plaintiffs seek to circumvent 
Section 230(c)(1)’s protections using the approach 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit below.  
3. The fallout from the decision below is also not 
limited to anticompetitive motivation.  Following in 
its logical footsteps, plaintiffs will ask courts to imply 
other exceptions based on the broad language in the 
findings and policy statements of Section 230(a) and 
(b).  Prominent U.S. Senators have already done so, 
suggesting that subsection (a)(3)’s finding that “[t]he 
Internet and other interactive computer services 
offer a forum for a true diversity of political dis-
course” should be read to imply an immunity excep-
tion if a defendant’s content moderation is not view-
point-neutral.17
If plaintiffs can persuade judges that an Internet 
service is not providing “educational and informa-
tional resources” or “unique opportunities for cultur-
al development,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1), (3), or is not 
“promot[ing] the continued development of the 
Internet,” id. § 230(b)(1), will the defendant lose 
Section 230 immunity?  Such potentially far-reaching 
17 See Press Release, Senator Ted Cruz, Sen. Cruz: The Pattern 
of Political Censorship Seen Across Technology Companies is 
Highly Concerning (Jan. 17, 2018), https://bit.ly/2zdfuMB (Sen. 
Cruz committee-hearing comment suggesting that “if you are 
not a neutral public forum,” then “the entire predicate for 
liability immunity” under Section 230 is not satisfied); Senator 
Josh Hawley (@HawleyMO), Twitter (Nov. 27, 2018, 1:22 PM), 
https://bit.ly/2VB3CLQ (suggesting same). 
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arguments will be hard to distinguish from the Ninth 
Circuit’s use of the policy statements to limit the 
scope of immunity in this case. 
III. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO 
RESOLVE THE QUESTION PRESENTED, 
AND OTHER OPPORTUNITIES MAY NOT 
SOON PRESENT THEMSELVES. 
1. This case presents an important and purely legal 
question to the Court without any complicating 
factual or procedural issues.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling that Enigma’s complaint should survive 
dismissal hinges entirely on a straightforward ques-
tion of statutory interpretation about the scope of 
Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s immunity.  That is an im-
portant question that is cleanly presented for this 
Court to answer. 
2. Moreover, this Court may not soon get a better 
chance to answer the question presented.  As the 
framers of Section 230 recognized, the cost of litiga-
tion may itself be enough to force defendants to 
settle.  See supra pp. 5-6, 24-29.  When facing oner-
ous discovery and legal fees, providers like Malware-
bytes may well have to capitulate to plaintiffs’ de-
mands not to be marked as threats, making the 
Internet a more dangerous place for consumers and 
depriving courts of the ability to provide further 
guidance on Section 230’s immunities.  If the Ninth 
Circuit’s atextual exceptions leak into the surround-
ing provisions of Section 230, see supra pp. 31-34, 
Internet platforms deciding whether to filter offen-
sive content or whether to remove third-party con-
tent challenged by a litigious plaintiff will have 
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similar incentives to settle rather than bear the cost 
of litigation. 
Those dangers are especially heightened because of 
the Ninth Circuit’s outsized role in the technology 
and Internet sphere.  The decision below severely 
limited the main precedent that scholars have cred-
ited with dissuading suits nationwide against com-
panies providing filtering tools.18  Because so many 
technology companies are based within the Ninth 
Circuit, plaintiffs will often have the ability and 
incentive to bring suit in that circuit, minimizing the 
chances that another court of appeals or state court 
will be presented with the same question. 
In short, by the time this Court is presented with 
another opportunity to evaluate whether Section 230 
allows judge-made, policy-based exceptions, there is 
a great danger that filtering-software providers and 
others who rely on Section 230 will already have 
modified their business practices in response to the 
decision below, making the Internet a less safe and 
vibrant place for consumers.   
18 See Eric Goldman, The Ten Most Important Section 230 
Rulings, 20 Tulane J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 1, 6-7 (2017). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of 
certiorari should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TYLER GRIFFIN NEWBY
FENWICK & WEST LLP 
555 California Street 
12th Floor 
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Communications Decency Act 
The panel filed (1) an order withdrawing its 
opinion and replacing the opinion with an amended 
opinion, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and 
denying on behalf of the court a petition for 
rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion 
reversing the district court’s dismissal, as barred by 
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act, of claims 
under New York law and the Lanham Act’s false 
advertising provision. 
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, and 
Malwarebytes, Inc., were providers of software that 
helped internet users to filter unwanted content from 
their computers. Enigma alleged that Malwarebytes 
configured its software to block users from accessing 
Enigma’s software in order to divert Enigma’s 
customers. 
Section 230, the so-called “Good Samaritan” 
provision of the Communications Decency Act, 
immunizes software providers from liability for 
actions taken to help users block certain types of 
unwanted online material, including material that is 
of a violent or sexual nature or is “otherwise 
objectionable.” Distinguishing Zango, Inc. v. 
Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009), 
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the 
court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of 
the reader. 
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the panel held that the phrase “otherwise 
objectionable” does not include software that the 
provider finds objectionable for anticompetitive 
reasons. As to the state-law claims, the panel held 
that Enigma’s allegations of anticompetitive animus 
were sufficient to withstand dismissal. As to the 
federal claim, the panel further held that § 230’s 
exception for intellectual property claims did not 
apply because this false advertising claim did not 
relate to trademarks or any other type of intellectual 
property. The panel remanded the case for further 
proceedings. 
Dissenting, Judge Rawlinson wrote that § 230 is 
broadly worded, and Enigma did not persuasively 
make a case for limitation of the statute beyond its 
provisions. 
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ORDER 
The opinion filed September 12, 2019 (Docket 
Entry No. 42), and appearing at 938 F.3d 1026, is 
withdrawn and replaced by an amended opinion 
concurrently filed with this order. 
With these amendments, Judge Rawlinson voted to 
grant the petition for panel rehearing. Judges 
Schroeder and Lasnik voted to deny the petition for 
panel rehearing. Judge Rawlinson voted to grant the 
petition for rehearing en banc. Judges Schroeder and 
Lasnik recommended denying the petition for 
rehearing en banc. 
The full court has been advised of the petition for 
rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote 
on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. 
App. P. 35. 
The petition for rehearing and petition for 
rehearing en banc are DENIED. No further petitions 
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for rehearing or rehearing en banc will be 
entertained. 
OPINION 
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge: 
OVERVIEW 
This dispute concerns § 230, the so-called “Good 
Samaritan” provision of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996, enacted primarily to protect 
minors from harmful online viewing. The provision 
immunizes computer-software providers from 
liability for actions taken to help users block certain 
types of unwanted, online material. The provision 
expressly describes material of a violent or sexual 
nature, but also includes a catchall for material that 
is “otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). We 
have previously recognized that the provision 
establishes a subjective standard whereby internet 
users and software providers decide what online 
material is objectionable. See Zango Inc. v. Kaspersky 
Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009). 
The parties to this dispute are both providers of 
software that help internet users filter unwanted 
content from their computers. Plaintiff-Appellant 
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC has alleged 
violations of New York state law and a violation of 
the Lanham Act’s false advertising provision. Each 
claim is based on the allegation that defendant, 
Malwarebytes Inc., has configured its software to 
block users from accessing Enigma’s software in 
order to divert Enigma’s customers. The district 
court, relying on Zango, dismissed the action as 
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barred by § 230’s broad recognition of immunity. We 
did not hold in Zango, however, that the immunity 
was limitless. 
This case differs from Zango in that here the 
parties are competitors. In this appeal Enigma 
contends that the “otherwise objectionable” catchall 
is not broad enough to encompass a provider’s 
objection to a rival’s software in order to suppress 
competition. Enigma points to Judge Fisher’s 
concurrence in Zango warning against an overly 
expansive interpretation of the provision that could 
lead to anticompetitive results. We heed that 
warning and reverse the district court’s decision that 
read Zango to require such an interpretation. We 
hold that the phrase “otherwise objectionable” does 
not include software that the provider finds 
objectionable for anticompetitive reasons. 
Malwarebytes contends that it had legitimate 
reasons for finding Enigma’s software objectionable 
apart from any anticompetitive effect, and that 
immunity should therefore apply on Enigma’s state-
law claims, even if the district court erred in its 
interpretation of Zango. We conclude, however, that 
Enigma’s allegations of anticompetitive animus are 
sufficient to withstand dismissal. 
Enigma’s federal claim warrants an additional 
analytical step. The CDA’s immunity provision 
contains an exception for intellectual property 
claims, stating that “[n]othing in this section shall be 
construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to 
intellectual property.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). Enigma 
has brought a false advertising claim under the 
Lanham Act, a federal statute that deals with 
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trademarks. Enigma contends that the false 
advertising claim is one “pertaining to intellectual 
property” and thus outside the scope of § 230 
immunity. 
Although it is true that the Lanham Act itself deals 
with intellectual property, i.e. trademarks, Enigma’s 
false advertising claim does not relate to trademarks 
or any other type of intellectual property. The 
district court therefore correctly held that the 
intellectual property exception to immunity does not 
apply to the false advertising claim. The district 
court went on to hold that under Zango’s application 
of § 230 immunity, Malwarebytes was immune from 
liability for false advertising. As with Enigma’s state 
law claims, we hold that the district court read 
Zango too broadly in dismissing the federal claim. 
We therefore reverse the judgment on this claim as 
well. 
STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
This appeal centers on the immunity provision 
contained in § 230(c)(2) of the Communications 
Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1996). The 
CDA, which was enacted as part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, contains this “Good 
Samaritan” provision that, in subparagraph B, 
immunizes internet-service providers from liability 
for giving internet users the technical means to 
restrict access to the types of material described in 
the subparagraph A. Id. § 230(c)(2)(B).  The material, 
as described in that subparagraph, is “material that 
the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
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lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable.” Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).1
This grant of immunity dates back to the early 
days of the internet when concerns first arose about 
children being able to access online pornography. 
Parents could not program their computers to block 
online pornography, and this was at least partially 
due to a combination of trial court decisions in New 
York that had deterred the creation of online-
filtration efforts. In the first case, Cubby, Inc. v. 
CompuServe, Inc., a federal court held that passive 
providers of online services and content were not 
charged with knowledge of, or responsibility for, the 
content on their network. See 776 F. Supp. 135, 139–
43 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Therefore, if a provider remained 
passive and uninvolved in filtering third-party 
material from its network, the provider could not be 
1 Section 230(c) is entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ 
blocking and screening of offensive material.” The relevant 
subsection (2), “Civil liability,” states, in full, as follows: 
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be held liable on account of – 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or 
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical 
means to restrict access to material described in 
paragraph [A].” 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A), (B). 
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held liable for any offensive content it carried from 
third parties. See id. 
The corollary of this rule, as later articulated by a 
New York state trial court, was that once a service 
provider undertook to filter offensive content from its 
network, it assumed responsibility for any offensive 
content it failed to filter, even if it lacked knowledge 
of the content. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 
24, 1995) (“Prodigy’s conscious choice, to gain the 
benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a 
greater liability than CompuServe and other 
computer networks that make no such choice.”), 
superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act, 
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137, as recognized in 
Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of N.Y., Inc., 952 
N.E.2d 1011 (2011). Representative Chris Cox 
warned during debates on proposed legislation aimed 
at overruling Stratton Oakmont, that premising 
liability on providers’ efforts to filter out offensive 
material was deterring software companies from 
providing the filtering software and tools that could 
help parents block pornography and other offensive 
material from their home computers. See 141 Cong. 
Rec. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). 
The Stratton Oakmont decision, along with the 
increasing public concern about pornography on the 
internet, served as catalysts for legislators to 
consider greater internet regulation. Congress 
considered, in early 1995, two different amendments 
to the Telecommunications Act. The first, called the 
Exon-Coats amendment, targeted pornography at 
the source by prohibiting its dissemination. See id. at 
16,068. Proponents of this bill argued that parents 
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lacked the technological sophistication needed to 
implement online-filtration tools and that the 
government therefore needed to step in. Id. at 
16,099. The second proposal, entitled the Online 
Family Empowerment Act (“OFEA”), targeted 
internet pornography at the receiving end by 
encouraging further development of filtration tools. 
Id. at 22,044. Proponents of this bill pointed out that 
prohibiting pornography at the source raised 
constitutional issues involving prior restraint, and 
argued that parents, not government bureaucrats, 
were better positioned to protect their children from 
offensive online material. Id. at 16,013. 
On February 1, 1996, Congress enacted both 
approaches as part of the CDA. The Exon-Coats 
amendment was codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223, but was 
later invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 
877–79 (1997). Before us is OFEA’s approach, 
enacted as § 230(c)(2) of the CDA. See Pub L. No. 
104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39. By immunizing 
internet-service providers from liability for any 
action taken to block, or help users block offensive 
and objectionable online content, Congress overruled 
Stratton Oakmont and thereby encouraged the 
development of more sophisticated methods of online 
filtration. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104879, at 194 
(1996). 
The history of § 230(c)(2) shows that access to 
pornography was Congress’s motivating concern, but 
the language used in § 230 included much more, 
covering any online material considered to be 
“excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable.” See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)–(B). 
Perhaps to guide the interpretation of this broad 
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language, Congress took the rather unusual step of 
setting forth policy goals in the immediately 
preceding paragraph of the statute. See id. § 230(b). 
Of the five goals, three are particularly relevant 
here. These goals were “to encourage the 
development of technologies which maximize user 
control”; “to empower parents to restrict their 
children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate 
online content”; and “to preserve the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the 
Internet and other interactive computer services.” 
See id. § 230(b)(2)–(4). 
This court has decided one prior case where we 
considered the scope of § 230, but were principally 
concerned with which types of online-service 
providers Congress intended to immunize. See 
Zango, 568 F.3d at 1175. We acknowledged that 
providers of computer security software can benefit 
from § 230 immunity, and that such providers have 
discretion to identify what online content is 
considered “objectionable,” id., but we had no reason 
to discuss the scope of that discretion. The separate 
concurrence in Zango focused on the future need for 
considering appropriate limitations on provider 
control. See id. at 1178–80 (Fisher, J. concurring). 
District courts have differed in their interpretations 
of Zango and the discretion granted to providers. 
What is clear to us from the statutory language, 
history, and case law is that providers do not have 
unfettered discretion to declare online content 
“objectionable” and blocking and filtering decisions 
that are driven by anticompetitive animus are not 
entitled to immunity under section 230(c)(2). 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff-appellant Enigma Software Group USA, 
LLC, is a Florida company that sells computer 
security software nationwide. Malwarebytes Inc., a 
Delaware corporation headquartered in California, 
also sells computer security software nationwide. 
Malwarebytes and Enigma are therefore direct 
competitors. 
Providers of computer security software help users 
identify and block malicious or threatening software, 
termed malware, from their computers. Each 
provider generates its own criteria to determine 
what software might threaten users. Defendant 
Malwarebytes programs its software to search for 
what it calls Potentially Unwanted Programs 
(“PUPs”). PUPs include, for example, what 
Malwarebytes describes as software that contains 
“obtrusive, misleading, or deceptive advertisements, 
branding or search practices.” Once Malwarebytes’s 
security software is purchased and installed on a 
user’s computer, it scans for PUPs, and according to 
Enigma’s complaint, if the user tries to download a 
program that Malwarebytes has determined to be a 
PUP, a pop-up alert warns the user of a security risk 
and advises the user to stop the download and block 
the potentially threatening content. 
Malwarebytes and Enigma have been direct 
competitors since 2008, the year of Malwarebytes’s 
inception. In their first eight years as competitors, 
neither Enigma nor Malwarebytes flagged the 
other’s software as threatening or unwanted. In late 
2016, however, Malwarebytes revised its PUP-
detection criteria to include any program that, 
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according to Malwarebytes, users did not seem to 
like. 
After the revision, Malwarebytes’s software 
immediately began flagging Enigma’s most popular 
programs — RegHunter and SpyHunter — as PUPs.  
Thereafter, anytime a user with Malwarebytes’s 
software tried to download those Enigma programs, 
the user was alerted of a security risk and, according 
to Enigma’s complaint, the download was prohibited, 
i.e. Malwarebytes “quarantined” the programs. 
Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes’s new definition 
of a PUP includes subjective criteria that 
Malwarebytes has “implemented at its own malicious 
whim” in order to identify Enigma’s programs as 
threats. Enigma characterizes the revision as a 
“guise” for anticompetitive conduct, and alleges that 
its programs are “legitimate”, “highly regarded”, and 
“pose no security threat.” As a result of 
Malwarebytes’s actions, Enigma claims that it has 
lost customers and revenue and experienced harm to 
its reputation. 
Enigma brought this action against Malwarebytes 
in early 2017, in the Southern District of New York. 
Enigma claimed that Malwarebytes has used its 
PUP-modification process to advance a “bad faith 
campaign of unfair competition” aimed at “deceiving 
consumers and interfering with [Enigma’s] customer 
relationships.” 
Enigma’s complaint alleged four claims, three 
under New York state law and one under federal 
law. The first state-law claim accused Malwarebytes 
of using deceptive business practices in violation of 
New York General Business Law § 349. Enigma’s 
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second and third state-law claims alleged tortious 
interference with business and contractual relations 
in violation of New York state common law. The 
federal claim accused Malwarebytes of making false 
and misleading statements to deceive consumers into 
choosing Malwarebytes’s security software over 
Enigma’s, in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1)(B). 
Malwarebytes sought a change of venue. Although 
Enigma maintained that venue was proper in New 
York because Malwarebytes’s conduct affected users 
and computers within that state, the conduct at issue 
had national reach. The district court therefore 
granted Malwarebytes’s motion to transfer the case 
to the Northern District of California, where 
Malwarebytes is headquartered. 
Malwarebytes then moved to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, arguing that it was immune from 
liability under § 230(c)(2) of the CDA. The district 
court granted the motion, finding that under the 
reasoning of our decision in Zango, Malwarebytes 
was immune under § 230 on all of Enigma’s claims. 
The district court interpreted Zango to mean that 
anti-malware software providers are free to block 
users from accessing any material that those 
providers, in their discretion, deem to be 
objectionable.  Given Malwarebytes’s status as a 
provider of filtering software, and its assertion that 
Enigma’s programs are potentially unwanted, the 
district court held that Malwarebytes could not be 
liable under state law for blocking users’ access to 
Enigma’s programs. 
15a 
With respect to the federal claim, the district court 
had to consider the intellectual property exception to 
the CDA’s immunity provision set forth in 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(2). The somewhat opaque exception states 
that § 230 immunity “shall not be construed to limit 
or expand any law pertaining to intellectual 
property.” Id. Enigma’s federal claim alleged false 
advertising under the Lanham Act, and Enigma 
contended that immunity did not apply because that 
statute deals with intellectual property, i.e. 
trademarks. The district court reasoned, however, 
that although the Lanham Act itself deals with 
intellectual property, Enigma’s false advertising 
claim did not relate to any type of intellectual 
property and therefore § 230 immunity encompassed 
that claim as well. Having concluded that 
Malwarebytes was immune on all four claims, the 
district court dismissed the complaint and granted 
judgment for Malwarebytes. 
On appeal, Enigma primarily contends that the 
district court erred in interpreting our Zango opinion 
to give online service providers unlimited discretion 
to block online content, and that the Good Samaritan 
blocking provision does not provide such sweeping 
immunity that it encompasses anticompetitive 
conduct. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Scope of § 230(c)(2) Immunity as Applied to 
State-Law Claims 
The district court held that our opinion in Zango 
controlled, and interpreted Zango to mean that an 
online-service provider cannot be liable for blocking 
internet users from accessing online content that the 
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provider considers objectionable, regardless of the 
provider’s motivations or the harmful effects of the 
blocking. The scope of the statutory catchall phrase, 
“otherwise objectionable,” was not at issue in Zango, 
however. The central issue in Zango was whether § 
230 immunity applies to filtering software providers 
like the defendant Kaspersky in that case, and both 
parties in this case. See 568 F.3d at 1173, 1176. We 
held such providers had immunity. Id. at 1177–78. 
At the end of our majority opinion, we emphasized 
the relevant statutory language in stating that § 230 
permits providers to block material “that either the 
provider or the user considers . . . objectionable.” See 
id. at 1177 (original emphasis). The district court 
focused on that sentence and reasoned that 
Malwarebytes had unfettered discretion to select 
what criteria makes a program “objectionable” under 
§ 230, and further, that the court was not to analyze 
Malwarebytes’s reasons for doing so. 
The majority in Zango did not, however, address 
whether there were limitations on a provider’s 
discretion to declare online content “objectionable.” 
No such issue was raised in the appeal. We noted 
that Zango “waived” the argument that its software 
was not “objectionable.” See id. at 1176–77. We 
therefore held that § 230 immunity covered 
Kaspersky’s decision to block users from accessing 
the type of content at issue in that case and 
concluded that § 230 permits providers to block 
material that “the provider considers . . . 
objectionable.” Id. at 1177. 
It was Judge Fisher’s concurring opinion in Zango 
that framed the issue for future litigation as to 
whether the term “objectionable” might be construed 
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in a way that would immunize providers even if they 
blocked online content for improper reasons. See id. 
at 1178–80 (Fisher, J. concurring). Judge Fisher 
warned that extending immunity beyond the facts of 
that case could “pose serious problems,” particularly 
where a provider is charged with using § 230 
immunity to advance an anticompetitive agenda. See 
id. at 1178. He said that an “unbounded” reading of 
the phrase “otherwise objectionable” would allow a 
content provider to “block content for anticompetitive 
purposes or merely at its malicious whim.” Id.
District courts nationwide have grappled with the 
issues discussed in Zango’s majority and concurring 
opinions, and have reached differing results. Like the 
district court in this case, at least two other federal 
district courts have relied on Zango to dismiss 
software-provider lawsuits against Malwarebytes 
where the plaintiff claimed that Malwarebytes 
improperly characterized the plaintiff’s software as a 
PUP. See PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v. 
Malwarebytes Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 
2019); PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v. Malwarebytes, 
Inc., No. 1:18-CV-234-RP, 2018 WL 2996897, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2018). 
Other district courts have viewed our holding in 
Zango to be less expansive. See Song fi Inc. v. Google, 
Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(noting that just because “the statute requires the 
user or service provider to subjectively believe the 
blocked or screened material is objectionable does 
not mean anything or everything YouTube finds 
subjectively objectionable is within the scope of 
Section 230(c),” and concluding that, “[o]n the 
contrary such an ‘unbounded’ reading . . . would 
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enable content providers to ‘block content for 
anticompetitive reasons[.]’”) (quoting Judge Fisher’s 
concurrence in Zango); Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 997 
F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (same); see 
also Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. 
Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011) 
(acknowledging that a provider’s subjective 
determination of what constitutes objectionable 
material under § 230(c)(2) is not limitless, but 
finding that the harassing emails in that case were 
reasonably objectionable). 
We find these decisions recognizing limitations in 
the scope of immunity to be persuasive. The courts 
interpreting Zango as providing unlimited immunity 
seem to us to have stretched our opinion in Zango too 
far. This is because the focus of that appeal was 
neither what type of material may be blocked, nor 
why it may be blocked, but rather who benefits from 
§ 230 immunity. The issue was whether § 230 
immunity applies to filtering-software providers. See 
Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173. We answered that question 
in the affirmative, explaining that Kaspersky was 
the type of “interactive computer service” to which § 
230(c)(2) expressly referred, and that Kaspersky was 
engaged in the type of conduct to which § 230(c)(2) 
generally applies. Id. at 1175–76. 
As relevant here, the majority opinion in Zango 
establishes only that Malwarebytes, as a filtering-
software provider, is an entity to which the 
immunity afforded by § 230 would apply. The 
majority opinion does not require us to hold that we 
lack the authority to question Malwarebytes’s 
determinations of what content to block. We must 
therefore in this case analyze § 230 to decide what 
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limitations, if any, there are on the ability of a 
filtering software provider to block users from 
receiving online programming. 
The legal question before us is whether § 230(c)(2) 
immunizes blocking and filtering decisions that are 
driven by anticompetitive animus. The majority in 
Zango had no occasion to address the issue, and the 
parties in that case were not competitors. See 568 F. 
3d at 1170 (explaining Kaspersky is a security 
software provider; Zango provides an online service 
for users to stream movies, video games, and music). 
This is the first § 230 case we are aware of that 
involves direct competitors. 
In this appeal, Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes 
blocked Enigma’s programs for anticompetitive 
reasons, not because the programs’ content was 
objectionable within the meaning of § 230, and that 
§ 230 does not provide immunity for anticompetitive 
conduct. Malwarebytes’s position is that, given the 
catchall, Malwarebytes has immunity regardless of 
any anticompetitive motives. 
We cannot accept Malwarebytes’s position, as it 
appears contrary to CDA’s history and purpose. 
Congress expressly provided that the CDA aims “to 
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market 
that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services” and to “remove 
disincentives for the development and utilization of 
blocking and filtering technologies.” § 230(b)(2)–(3). 
Congress said it gave providers discretion to identify 
objectionable content in large part to protect 
competition, not suppress it. Id. In other words, 
Congress wanted to encourage the development of 
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filtration technologies, not to enable software 
developers to drive each other out of business. 
In the infancy of the internet, the unwillingness of 
Congress to spell out the meaning of “otherwise 
objectionable” was understandable. The broad grant 
of protective control over online content may have 
been more readily acceptable in an era before the 
potential magnitude of internet communication was 
fully comprehended. Indeed, the fears of harmful 
content at the time led Congress to enact, in the 
same statute, an outright ban on the dissemination 
of online pornography, a ban which the Supreme 
Court swiftly rejected as unconstitutional a year 
later. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 877–79 
(striking down 47 U.S.C. § 223). 
We must today recognize that interpreting the 
statute to give providers unbridled discretion to 
block online content would, as Judge Fisher warned, 
enable and potentially motivate internet-service 
providers to act for their own, and not the public, 
benefit. See 568 F.3d at 1178 (Fisher, J., concurring). 
Immunity for filtering practices aimed at 
suppressing competition, rather than protecting 
internet users, would lessen user control over what 
information they receive, contrary to Congress’s 
stated policy. See § 230(b)(3) (to maximize user 
control over what content they view). Indeed, users 
selecting a security software provider must trust 
that the provider will block material consistent with 
that user’s desires. Users would not reasonably 
anticipate providers blocking valuable online content 
in order to stifle competition. Immunizing 
anticompetitive blocking would, therefore, be 
contrary to another of the statute’s express policies: 
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“removing disincentives for the utilization of blocking 
and filtering technologies.” Id. § 230(b)(4). 
We therefore reject Malwarebytes’s position that 
§ 230 immunity applies regardless of anticompetitive 
purpose. But we cannot, as Enigma asks us to do, 
ignore the breadth of the term “objectionable” by 
construing it to cover only material that is sexual or 
violent in nature. Enigma would have us read the 
general, catchall phrase “otherwise objectionable” as 
limited to the categories of online material described 
in the seven specific categories that precede it. See 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (describing material that is 
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing or otherwise objectionable.”). Enigma 
argues that its software has no such content, and 
that Malwarebytes therefore cannot claim immunity 
for blocking it. 
Enigma relies on the principle of ejusdem generis, 
which teaches that when a generic term follows 
specific terms, the generic term should be construed 
to reference subjects akin to those with the specific 
enumeration. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. 
Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991). 
But the specific categories listed in § 230(c)(2) vary 
greatly: Material that is lewd or lascivious is not 
necessarily similar to material that is violent, or 
material that is harassing. If the enumerated 
categories are not similar, they provide little or no 
assistance in interpreting the more general category. 
We have previously recognized this concept. See 
Sacramento Reg’l Cty. Sanitation Dist. v. Reilly, 905 
F.2d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Where the list of 
objects that precedes the ‘or other’ phrase is 
dissimilar, ejusdem generis does not apply”). 
22a 
We think that the catchall was more likely 
intended to encapsulate forms of unwanted online 
content that Congress could not identify in the 
1990s. But even if ejusdem generis did apply, it 
would not support Enigma’s narrow interpretation of 
“otherwise objectionable.” Congress wanted to give 
internet users tools to avoid not only violent or 
sexually explicit materials, but also harassing 
materials. Spam, malware and adware could fairly 
be placed close enough to harassing materials to at 
least be called “otherwise objectionable” while still 
being faithful to the principle of ejusdem generis. 
Several district courts have, for example, regarded 
unsolicited marketing emails as “objectionable.” See, 
e.g., Holomaxx, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1104; e360Insight, 
LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608–610 
(N.D. Ill. 2008); see also Smith v. Trusted Universal 
Standards In Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. CIV09-
4567-RBK-KMW, 2010 WL 1799456, at *6 (D.N.J. 
May 4, 2010). But we do not, in this appeal, 
determine the precise relationship between the term 
“otherwise objectionable” and the seven categories 
that precede it. We conclude only that if a provider’s 
basis for objecting to and seeking to block materials 
is because those materials benefit a competitor, the 
objection would not fall within any category listed in 
the statute and the immunity would not apply. 
Malwarebytes’s fallback position is that, even if it 
would lack immunity for anticompetitive blocking, 
Malwarebytes has found Enigma’s programs 
“objectionable” for legitimate reasons based on the 
programs’ content. Malwarebytes asserts that 
Enigma’s programs, SpyHunter and RegHunter, use 
“deceptive tactics” to scare users into believing that 
they have to download Enigma’s programs to prevent 
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their computers from being infected. Enigma alleges, 
however, that its programs “pose no security threat” 
and that Malwarebytes’s justification for blocking 
these “legitimate” and “highly regarded” programs 
was a guise for anticompetitive animus. 
The district court interpreted our holding in Zango 
to foreclose this debate entirely, implicitly reasoning 
that if Malwarebytes has sole discretion to select 
what programs are “objectionable,” the court need 
not evaluate the reasons for the designation. Because 
we hold that § 230 does not provide immunity for 
blocking a competitor’s program for anticompetitive 
reasons, and because Enigma has specifically alleged 
that the blocking here was anticompetitive, Enigma’s 
claims survive the motion to dismiss. We therefore 
reverse the dismissal of Enigma’s state-law claims 
and we remand for further proceedings. 
II. The Federal Claim and the CDA’s 
Intellectual Property Exception 
Enigma’s fourth claim is a claim for false 
advertising under the Lanham Act, a statute dealing 
with a form of intellectual property, i.e. trademarks. 
Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes publicly 
mischaracterized Enigma’s programs SpyHunter and 
RegHunter as potentially unwanted or PUPs, and it 
did so in order to interfere with Enigma’s customer 
base and divert those customers to Malwarebytes. 
Section 230(e)(2) of the CDA contains an exception 
to immunity for intellectual property claims. See 47 
U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). This exception, known as the 
intellectual property carve out, states that § 230 
immunity shall not “limit or expand any law 
pertaining to intellectual property.” Id. In light of 
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that exception, Enigma contends that immunity 
would not bar Enigma’s Lanham Act claim, even if 
immunity is available to Malwarebytes on the state 
law claims. Although Enigma’s claim does not itself 
involve an intellectual property right, Enigma 
characterizes its federal false advertising claim as 
one “pertaining to intellectual property” within the 
meaning of § 230(e)(2) because the Lanham Act deals 
with intellectual property. The district court rejected 
this argument, and rightly so. 
This is because even though the Lanham Act is 
known as the federal trademark statute, not all 
claims brought under the statute involve 
trademarks. The Act contains two parts, one 
governing trademark infringement and another 
governing false designations of origin, false 
descriptions, and dilution. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1114 
(trademark infringement) with id. § 1125 (the rest). 
The latter, § 1125, creates two bases of liability, false 
association and false advertising. Compare 
§ 1125(a)(1)(A) (false association) with 
§ 1125(a)(1)(B) (false advertising). Thus, although 
“much of the Lanham Act addresses the registration, 
use, and infringement of trademarks and related 
marks, . . . § 1125(a) is one of the few provisions that 
goes beyond trademark protection.” Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28–29 
(2003). 
In this appeal, we must decide whether the 
exception to immunity contained in § 230(e)(2) 
applies to false advertising claims brought under the 
Lanham Act. Our court has not addressed the issue, 
although we have considered the exception as it 
would apply to state law claims. See Perfect 10 v. 
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CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(concluding that the intellectual property exception 
in § 230(e)(2) was not intended to cover intellectual 
property claims brought under state law); see also 
Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, L.L.C. v. Chumley, 840 
F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2016) (declining to 
analyze the intellectual property exception; 
explaining that because “§ 230 does not contain the 
grant of immunity from suit contended for, it is 
unnecessary to discuss its applicability to the 
Lanham Act false advertising claims”). 
We have observed before that because Congress did 
not define the term “intellectual property law,” it 
should be construed narrowly to advance the CDA’s 
express policy of providing broad immunity. See 
Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119. One of these express 
policy reasons for providing immunity was, as 
Congress stated in § 230(b)(2), “to preserve the 
vibrant and competitive free market that presently 
exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). The intellectual 
property exception is a limitation on immunity, and 
the CDA’s stated congressional purpose counsels 
against an expansive interpretation of the exception 
that would diminish the scope of immunity. If the 
intellectual property law exception were to 
encompass any claim raised under the Lanham Act—
including false advertising claims that do not directly 
involve intellectual property rights—it would create 
a potential for new liability that would upset, rather 
than “preserve” the vibrant culture of innovation on 
the internet that Congress envisioned. Id.
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We therefore hold that the intellectual property 
exception contained in § 230(e)(2) encompasses 
claims pertaining to an established intellectual 
property right under federal law, like those inherent 
in a patent, copyright, or trademark. The exception 
does not apply to false advertising claims brought 
under § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, unless the claim 
itself involves intellectual property. 
Here, Enigma’s Lanham Act claim derives from the 
statute’s false advertising provision. Enigma alleges 
that Malwarebytes mischaracterized Enigma’s most 
popular software programs in order to divert 
Enigma’s customers to Malwarebytes. These 
allegations do not relate to or involve trademark 
rights or any other intellectual property rights. Thus, 
Enigma’s false advertising claim is not a claim 
“pertaining to intellectual property law” within the 
meaning of § 230(e)(2). The district court correctly 
concluded that the intellectual property exception to 
immunity does not encompass Enigma’s Lanham Act 
claim. 
The district court went on to hold, however, as it 
did with the state law claims, that Malwarebytes is 
nevertheless immune from liability under our 
decision in Zango. As we have explained with respect 
to the state law claims, Zango did not define an 
unlimited scope of immunity under § 230, and 
immunity under that section does not extend to 
anticompetitive conduct. Because the federal claim, 
like the state claims, is based on allegations of such 
conduct, the federal claim survives dismissal. We 
therefore reverse the district court’s judgment in 
favor of Malwarebytes and remand for further 
proceedings on this claim as well. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the district court is reversed and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
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RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
In his concurring opinion in Zango, Inc. v. 
Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1179–80 (9th 
Cir. 2009), Judge Fisher acknowledged that “until 
Congress clarifies the statute or a future litigant 
makes the case for a possible limitation,” the 
“broadly worded” Communications Decency Act (the 
Act) afforded immunity to a distributor of Internet 
security software. Congress has not further clarified 
the statute and Enigma Software has not 
persuasively made a case for limitation of the statute 
beyond its provisions. 
The majority opinion seeks to limit the statute 
based on the fact that the parties are competitors. 
See Majority Opinion, p. 6. However, nothing in the 
statutory provisions or our majority opinion in Zango 
supports such a distinction. Rather the “broad 
language” of the Act specifically encompasses “any 
action voluntarily taken [by a provider] to restrict 
access to . . . material that the provider . . . considers 
to be . . . otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Under the language 
of the Act, so long as the provider’s action is taken to 
remove “otherwise objectionable” material, the 
restriction of access is immunized. See id. The 
majority’s real complaint is not that the district court 
construed the statute too broadly, but that the 
statute is written too broadly. However, that defect, 
if it is a defect, is one beyond our authority to correct. 
See Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 
2158, 2169 (2015). 
In particular, the majority holds that the criteria 
for blocking online material may not be based on the 
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identity of the entity that produced it. See Majority 
Opinion, p. 11. Unfortunately, however, that 
conclusion cannot be squared with the broad 
language of the Act. Under the language of the 
statute, if the blocked content is “otherwise 
objectionable” to the provider, the Act bestows 
immunity. Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173 (“[T]he statute 
plainly immunizes from suit a provider of interactive 
computer services that makes available software 
that filters or screens material that the user or the 
provider deems objectionable.”) (emphasis in the 
original); 1174 (“According protection to providers of 
programs that filter adware and malware is also 
consistent with the Congressional goals for immunity 
articulated in [47 U.S.C.] § 230 itself.”). Although the 
parties were not direct competitors, the plaintiff in 
Zango asserted similar anti-competition effects. See 
id. at 1171–72. The majority’s policy arguments are 
in conflict with our recognition in Zango that the 
broad language of the Act is consistent with “the 
Congressional goals for immunity” as expressed in 
the language of the statute. Id. at 1174. As the 
district court cogently noted, we “must presume that 
a legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut 
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) 
(citations omitted). 
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SUMMARY**
Communications Decency Act 
The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, as 
barred by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 
of claims under New York law and the Lanham Act’s 
false advertising provision. 
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, and 
Malwarebytes, Inc., were providers of software that 
helped internet users to filter unwanted content from 
their computers. Enigma alleged that Malwarebytes 
configured its software to block users from accessing 
Enigma’s software in order to divert Enigma’s 
customers. 
Section 230 immunizes software providers from 
liability for actions taken to help users block certain 
types of unwanted online material, including 
material that is of a violent or sexual nature or is 
“otherwise objectionable.” Distinguishing Zango, Inc. 
v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009), 
the panel held that the phrase “otherwise 
objectionable” does not include software that the 
provider finds objectionable for anticompetitive 
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the 
court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of 
the reader. 
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reasons. As to the state-law claims, the panel held 
that Enigma’s allegations of anticompetitive animus 
were sufficient to withstand dismissal. As to the 
federal claim, the panel further held that  
§ 230’s exception for intellectual property claims did 
not apply because this false advertising claim did not 
relate to trademarks or any other type of intellectual 
property. The panel remanded the case for further 
proceedings. 
Dissenting, Judge Rawlinson wrote that § 230 is 
broadly worded, and Enigma did not persuasively 
make a case for limitation of the statute beyond its 
provisions. 
COUNSEL 
Terry Budd (argued), Budd Law PLLC, Wexford, 
Pennsylvania; Christopher M. Verdini and Anna 
Shabalov, K&L Gates LLP, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania; Edward P. Sangster, K&L Gates LLP, 
San Francisco, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant. 
Tyler G. Newby (argued), Guinevere L. Job son, and 
Sapna Mehta, Fenwick & West LLP, San Francisco, 
California, for Defendant-Appellee.
OPINION 
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge: 
OVERVIEW 
This dispute concerns § 230, the so-called “Good 
Samaritan” provision of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996, enacted primarily to protect 
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minors from harmful online viewing. The provision 
immunizes computer-software providers from 
liability for actions taken to help users block certain 
types of unwanted, online material. The provision 
expressly describes material of a violent or sexual 
nature, but also includes a catchall for material that 
is “otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). We 
have previously recognized that the provision 
establishes a subjective standard whereby internet 
users and software providers decide what online 
material is objectionable. See Zango Inc. v. Kaspersky 
Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009). 
The parties to this dispute are both providers of 
software that help internet users filter unwanted 
content from their computers. Plaintiff-Appellant 
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC has alleged 
violations of New York state law and a violation of 
the Lanham Act’s false advertising provision. Each 
claim is based on the allegation that defendant, 
Malwarebytes Inc., has configured its software to 
block users from accessing Enigma’s software in 
order to divert Enigma’s customers. The district 
court, relying on Zango, dismissed the action as 
barred by § 230’s broad recognition of immunity. We 
did not hold in Zango, however, that the immunity 
was limitless. 
This case differs from Zango in that here the 
parties are competitors. In this appeal Enigma 
contends that the “otherwise objectionable” catchall 
is not broad enough to encompass a provider’s 
objection to a rival’s software in order to suppress 
competition. Enigma points to Judge Fisher’s 
concurrence in Zango warning against an overly 
expansive interpretation of the provision that could 
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lead to anticompetitive results. We heed that 
warning and reverse the district court’s decision that 
read Zango to require such an interpretation. We 
hold that the phrase “otherwise  
objectionable” does not include software that the 
provider finds objectionable for anticompetitive 
reasons. 
Malwarebytes contends that it had legitimate 
reasons for finding Enigma’s software objectionable 
apart from any anticompetitive effect, and that 
immunity should therefore apply on Enigma’s state-
law claims, even if the district court erred in its 
interpretation of Zango. We conclude, however, that 
Enigma’s allegations of anticompetitive animus are 
sufficient to withstand dismissal. 
Enigma’s federal claim warrants an additional 
analytical step. The CDA’s immunity provision 
contains an exception for intellectual property 
claims, stating that “[n]othing in this section shall be 
construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to 
intellectual property.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). Enigma 
has brought a false advertising claim under the 
Lanham Act, a federal statute that deals with 
trademarks. Enigma contends that the false 
advertising claim is one “pertaining to intellectual 
property” and thus outside the scope of § 230 
immunity. 
Although it is true that the Lanham Act itself deals 
with intellectual property, i.e. trademarks, Enigma’s 
false advertising claim does not relate to trademarks 
or any other type of intellectual property. The 
district court therefore correctly held that the 
intellectual property exception to immunity does not 
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apply to the false advertising claim. The district 
court went on to hold that under Zango’s application 
of § 230 immunity, Malwarebytes was immune from 
liability for false advertising. As with Enigma’s state 
law claims, we hold that the district court read 
Zango too broadly in dismissing the federal claim. 
We therefore reverse the judgment on this claim as 
well. 
STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
This appeal centers on the immunity provision 
contained in § 230(c)(2) of the Communications 
Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1996). The 
CDA, which was enacted as part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, contains this “Good 
Samaritan” provision that, in subparagraph B, 
immunizes internet-service providers from liability 
for giving internet users the technical means to 
restrict access to the types of material described in 
the subparagraph A. Id. § 230(c)(2)(B). The material, 
as described in that subparagraph, is “material that 
the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable.” Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).1  
1 Section 230(c) is entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ 
blocking and screening of offensive material.” The relevant 
subsection (2), “Civil liability,” states, in full, as follows: 
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be held liable on account of — 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or 
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
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This grant of immunity dates back to the early 
days of the internet when concerns first arose about 
children being able to access online pornography. 
Parents could not program their computers to block 
online pornography, and this was at least partially 
due to a combination of trial court decisions in New 
York that had deterred the creation of online-
filtration efforts. In the first case, Cubby, Inc. v. 
CompuServe, Inc., a federal court held that passive 
providers of online services and content were not 
charged with knowledge of, or responsibility for, the 
content on their network. See 776 F. Supp 135, 139-
43 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Therefore, if a provider remained 
passive and uninvolved in filtering third-party 
material from its network, the provider could not be 
held liable for any offensive content it carried from 
third parties. See id.
The corollary of this rule, as later articulated by a 
New York state trial court, was that once a service 
provider undertook to filter offensive content from its 
network, it assumed responsibility for any offensive 
content it failed to filter, even if it lacked knowledge 
of the content. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 
24, 1995) (“Prodigy’s conscious choice, to gain the 
benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a 
objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical 
means to restrict access to material described in 
paragraph [A].” 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A), (B). 
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greater liability than CompuServe and other 
computer networks that make no such choice.”), 
superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act, 
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137, as recognized in 
Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of N.Y., Inc., 952 
N.E.2d 1011 (2011). Representative Chris Cox 
warned during debates on proposed legislation aimed 
at overruling Stratton Oakmont, that premising 
liability on providers’ efforts to filter out offensive 
material was deterring software companies from 
providing the filtering software and tools that could 
help parents block pornography and other offensive 
material from their home computers. See 141 Cong. 
Rec. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). 
The Stratton Oakmont decision, along with the 
increasing public concern about pornography on the 
internet, served as catalysts for legislators to 
consider greater internet regulation. Congress 
considered, in early 1995, two different amendments 
to the Telecommunications Act. The first, called the 
Exon-Coats amendment, targeted pornography at 
the source by prohibiting its dissemination. See id. at 
16,068. Proponents of this bill argued that parents 
lacked the technological sophistication needed to 
implement online-filtration tools and that the 
government therefore needed to step in. Id. at 
16,099. The second proposal, entitled the Online 
Family Empowerment Act (“OFEA”), targeted 
internet pornography at the receiving end by 
encouraging further development of filtration tools. 
Id. at 22,044. Proponents of this bill pointed out that 
prohibiting pornography at the source raised 
constitutional issues involving prior restraint, and 
argued that parents, not government bureaucrats, 
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were better positioned to protect their children from 
offensive online material. Id. at 16,013. 
On February 1, 1996, Congress enacted both 
approaches as part of the CDA. The Exon-Coats 
amendment was codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223, but was 
later invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 
877-79 (1997). Before us is OFEA’s approach, 
enacted as § 230(c)(2) of the CDA. See Pub L. No. 
104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137-39. By immunizing 
internet-service providers from liability for any 
action taken to block, or help users block offensive 
and objectionable online content, Congress overruled 
Stratton Oakmont and thereby encouraged the 
development of more sophisticated methods of online 
filtration. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-879, at 194 
(1996). 
The history of § 230(c)(2) shows that access to 
pornography was Congress’s motivating concern, but 
the language used in § 230 included much more, 
covering any online material considered to be 
“excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable.” See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)—(B). 
Perhaps to guide the interpretation of this broad 
language, Congress took the rather unusual step of 
setting forth policy goals in the immediately 
preceding paragraph of the statute. See id. § 230(b). 
Of the five goals, three are particularly relevant 
here. These goals were “to encourage the 
development of technologies which maximize user 
control”; “to empower parents to restrict their 
children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate 
online content”; and “to preserve the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the 
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Internet and other interactive computer services.” 
See id. § 230(b)(2)—(4). 
This court has decided one prior case where we 
considered the scope of § 230, but were principally 
concerned with which types of online-service 
providers Congress intended to immunize. See 
Zango, 568 F.3d at 1175. We acknowledged that 
providers of computer security software can benefit 
from § 230 immunity, and that such providers have 
discretion to identify what online content is 
considered “objectionable,” id., but we had no reason 
to discuss the scope of that discretion. The separate 
concurrence in Zango focused on the future need for 
considering appropriate limitations on provider 
control. See id. at 1178-80 (Fisher, J. concurring). 
District courts have differed in their interpretations 
of Zango and the extent to which it encouraged 
providers to block material. What is clear to us from 
the statutory language, history and case law is that 
the criteria for blocking online material must be 
based on the characteristics of the online material, 
i.e. its content, and not on the identity of the entity 
that produced it. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff-appellant Enigma Software Group USA, 
LLC, is a Florida company that sells computer 
security software nationwide. Malwarebytes Inc., a 
Delaware corporation headquartered in California, 
also sells computer security software nationwide. 
Malwarebytes and Enigma are therefore direct 
competitors. 
Providers of computer security software help users 
identify and block malicious or threatening software, 
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termed malware, from their computers. Each 
provider generates its own criteria to determine 
what software might threaten users. Defendant 
Malwarebytes programs its software to search for 
what it calls Potentially Unwanted Programs 
(“PUPs”). PUPs include, for example, what 
Malwarebytes describes as software that contains 
“obtrusive, misleading, or deceptive advertisements, 
branding or search practices.” Once Malwarebytes’s 
security software is purchased and installed on a 
user’s computer, it scans for PUPs, and according to 
Enigma’s complaint, if the user tries to download a 
program that Malwarebytes has determined to be a 
PUP, a pop-up alert warns the user of a security risk 
and advises the user to stop the download and block 
the potentially threatening content. 
Malwarebytes and Enigma have been direct 
competitors since 2008, the year of Malwarebytes’s 
inception. In their first eight years as competitors, 
neither Enigma nor Malwarebytes flagged the 
other’s software as threatening or unwanted. In late 
2016, however, Malwarebytes revised its PUP-
detection criteria to include any program that, 
according to Malwarebytes, users did not seem to 
like. 
After the revision, Malwarebytes’s software 
immediately began flagging Enigma’s most popular 
programs—RegHunter and SpyHunter—as PUPs. 
Thereafter, anytime a user with Malwarebytes’s 
software tried to download those Enigma programs, 
the user was alerted of a security risk and, according 
to Enigma’s complaint, the download was prohibited, 
i.e. Malwarebytes “quarantined” the programs. 
Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes’s new definition 
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of a PUP includes subjective criteria that 
Malwarebytes has “implemented at its own malicious 
whim” in order to identify Enigma’s programs as 
threats. Enigma characterizes the revision as a 
“guise” for anticompetitive conduct, and alleges that 
its programs are “legitimate”, “highly regarded”, and 
“pose no security threat.” As a result of 
Malwarebytes’s actions, Enigma claims that it has 
lost customers and revenue and experienced harm to 
its reputation. 
Enigma brought this action against Malwarebytes 
in early 2017, in the Southern District of New York. 
Enigma claimed that Malwarebytes has used its 
PUP-modification process to advance a “bad faith 
campaign of unfair competition” aimed at “deceiving 
consumers and interfering with [Enigma’s] customer 
relationships.” 
Enigma’s complaint alleged four claims, three 
under New York state law and one under federal 
law. The first state-law claim accused Malwarebytes 
of using deceptive business practices in violation of 
New York General Business Law § 349. Enigma’s 
second and third state-law claims alleged tortious 
interference with business and contractual relations 
in violation of New York state common law. The 
federal claim accused Malwarebytes of making false 
and misleading statements to deceive consumers into 
choosing Malwarebytes’s security software over 
Enigma’s, in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1)(B). 
Malwarebytes sought a change of venue. Although 
Enigma maintained that venue was proper in New 
York because Malwarebytes’s conduct affected users 
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and computers within that state, the conduct at issue 
had national reach. The district court therefore 
granted Malwarebytes’s motion to transfer the case 
to the Northern District of California, where 
Malwarebytes is headquartered. 
Malwarebytes then moved to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, arguing that it was immune from 
liability under § 230(c)(2) of the CDA. The district 
court granted the motion, finding that under the 
reasoning of our decision in Zango, Malwarebytes 
was immune under § 230 on all of Enigma’s claims. 
The district court interpreted Zango to mean that 
anti-malware software providers are free to block 
users from accessing any material that those 
providers, in their discretion, deem to be 
objectionable. Given Malwarebytes’s status as a 
provider of filtering software, and its assertion that 
Enigma’s programs are potentially unwanted, the 
district court held that Malwarebytes could not be 
liable under state law for blocking users’ access to 
Enigma’s programs. 
With respect to the federal claim, the district court 
had to consider the intellectual property exception to 
the CDA’s immunity provision set forth in 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(2). The somewhat opaque exception states 
that § 230 immunity “shall not be construed to limit 
or expand any law pertaining to intellectual 
property.” Id. Enigma’s federal claim alleged false 
advertising under the Lanham Act, and Enigma 
contended that immunity did not apply because that 
statute deals with intellectual property, i.e. 
trademarks. The district court reasoned, however, 
that although the Lanham Act itself deals with 
intellectual property, Enigma’s false advertising 
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claim did not relate to any type of intellectual 
property and therefore § 230 immunity encompassed 
that claim as well. Having concluded that 
Malwarebytes was immune on all four claims, the 
district court dismissed the complaint and granted 
judgment for Malwarebytes. 
On appeal, Enigma primarily contends that the 
district court erred in interpreting our Zango opinion 
to give online service providers unlimited discretion 
to block online content, and that the Good Samaritan 
blocking provision does not provide such sweeping 
immunity that it encompasses anticompetitive 
conduct. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Scope of § 230(c)(2) Immunity as Applied to 
State-Law Claims 
The district court held that our opinion in Zango 
controlled, and interpreted Zango to mean that an 
online-service provider cannot be liable for blocking 
internet users from accessing online content that the 
provider considers objectionable, regardless of the 
provider’s motivations or the harmful effects of the 
blocking. The scope of the statutory catchall phrase, 
“otherwise objectionable,” was not at issue in Zango, 
however. The central issue in Zango was whether  
§ 230 immunity applies to filtering software 
providers like the defendant Kaspersky in that case, 
and both parties in this case. See 568 F.3d at 1173, 
1176. We held such providers had immunity. Id. at 
1177-78. At the end of our majority opinion, we 
emphasized the relevant statutory language in 
stating that § 230 permits providers to block 
material “that either the provider or the user 
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considers . . . objectionable.” See id. at 1177 (original 
emphasis). The district court focused on that 
sentence and reasoned that Malwarebytes had 
unfettered discretion to select what criteria makes a 
program “objectionable” under § 230, and further, 
that the court was not to analyze Malwarebytes’s 
reasons for doing so. 
The majority in Zango did not, however, address 
whether there were limitations on a provider’s 
discretion to declare online content “objectionable.” 
No such issue was raised in the appeal. We noted 
that Zango “waived” the argument that its software 
was not “objectionable.” See id. at 1176-77. We 
therefore held that § 230 immunity covered 
Kaspersky’s decision to block users from accessing 
the type of content at issue in that case and 
concluded that § 230 permits providers to block 
material that “the provider considers . . . 
objectionable.” Id. at 1177. 
It was Judge Fisher’s concurring opinion in Zango 
that framed the issue for future litigation as to 
whether the term “objectionable” might be construed 
in a way that would immunize providers even if they 
blocked online content for improper reasons. See id. 
at 1178-80 (Fisher, J. concurring). Judge Fisher 
warned that extending immunity beyond the facts of 
that case could “pose serious problems,” particularly 
where a provider is charged with using § 230 
immunity to advance an anticompetitive agenda. See 
id. at 1178. He said that an “unbounded” reading of 
the phrase “otherwise objectionable” would allow a 
content provider to “block content for anticompetitive 
purposes or merely at its malicious whim.” Id.
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District courts nationwide have grappled with the 
issues discussed in Zango’s majority and concurring 
opinions, and have reached differing results. Like the 
district court in this case, at least two other federal 
district courts have relied on Zango to dismiss 
software-provider lawsuits against Malwarebytes 
where the plaintiff claimed that Malwarebytes 
improperly characterized the plaintiffs software as a 
PUP. See PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v. 
Malwarebytes Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 
2019); PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v. Malwarebytes, 
Inc., No. 1:18-CV-234-RP, 2018 WL 2996897, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2018). 
Other district courts have viewed our holding in 
Zango to be less expansive. See Song fi Inc. v. Google, 
Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(noting that just because “the statute requires the 
user or service provider to subjectively believe the 
blocked or screened material is objectionable does 
not mean anything or everything YouTube finds 
subjectively objectionable is within the scope of 
Section 230(c),” and concluding that, “[o]n the 
contrary such an ‘unbounded’ reading . . . would 
enable content providers to ‘block content for 
anticompetitive reasons[.]”‘) (quoting Judge Fisher’s 
concurrence in Zango); Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 997 
F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (same); see 
also Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. 
Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011) 
(acknowledging that a provider’s subjective 
determination of what constitutes objectionable 
material under § 230(c)(2) is not limitless, but 
finding that the harassing emails in that case were 
reasonably objectionable). 
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We find these decisions recognizing limitations in 
the scope of immunity to be persuasive. The courts 
interpreting Zango as providing unlimited immunity 
seem to us to have stretched our opinion in Zango too 
far. This is because the focus of that appeal was 
neither what type of material may be blocked, nor 
why it may be blocked, but rather who benefits from 
§ 230 immunity. The issue was whether § 230 
immunity applies to filtering-software providers. See 
Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173. We answered that question 
in the affirmative, explaining that Kaspersky was 
the type of “interactive computer service” to which  
§ 230(c)(2) expressly referred, and that Kaspersky 
was engaged in the type of conduct to which  
§ 230(c)(2) generally applies. Id. at 1175-76. 
As relevant here, the majority opinion in Zango 
establishes only that Malwarebytes, as a filtering-
software provider, is an entity to which the 
immunity afforded by § 230 would apply. The 
majority opinion does not require us to hold that we 
lack the authority to question Malwarebytes’s 
determinations of what content to block. We must 
therefore in this case analyze § 230 to decide what 
limitations, if any, there are on the ability of a 
filtering software provider to block users from 
receiving online programming. 
The legal question before us is whether § 230(c)(2) 
immunizes blocking and filtering decisions that are 
driven by anticompetitive animus. The majority in 
Zango had no occasion to address the issue, and the 
parties in that case were not competitors. See 568 F. 
3d at 1170 (explaining Kaspersky is a security 
software provider; Zango provides an online service 
for users to stream movies, video games, and music). 
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This is the first § 230 case we are aware of that 
involves direct competitors. 
In this appeal, Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes 
blocked Enigma’s programs for anticompetitive 
reasons, not because the programs’ content was 
objectionable within the meaning of § 230, and that  
§ 230 does not provide immunity for anticompetitive 
conduct. Malwarebytes’s position is that, given the 
catchall, Malwarebytes has immunity regardless of 
any anticompetitive motives. 
We cannot accept Malwarebytes’s position, as it 
appears contrary to CDA’s history and purpose. 
Congress expressly provided that the CDA aims “to 
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market 
that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services” and to “remove 
disincentives for the development and utilization of 
blocking and filtering technologies.” § 230(b)(2)–(3). 
Congress said it gave providers discretion to identify 
objectionable content in large part to protect 
competition, not suppress it. Id. In other words, 
Congress wanted to encourage the development of 
filtration technologies, not to enable software 
developers to drive each other out of business. 
In the infancy of the internet, the unwillingness of 
Congress to spell out the meaning of “otherwise 
objectionable” was understandable. The broad grant 
of protective control over online content may have 
been more readily acceptable in an era before the 
potential magnitude of internet communication was 
fully comprehended. Indeed, the fears of harmful 
content at the time led Congress to enact, in the 
same statute, an outright ban on the dissemination 
48a 
of online pornography, a ban which the Supreme 
Court swiftly rejected as unconstitutional a year 
later. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 877-79 (striking 
down 47 U.S.C. § 223). 
We must today recognize that interpreting the 
statute to give providers unbridled discretion to 
block online content would, as Judge Fisher warned, 
enable and potentially motivate internet-service 
providers to act for their own, and not the public, 
benefit. See 568 F.3d at 1178 (Fisher, J., concurring). 
Immunity for filtering practices aimed at 
suppressing competition, rather than protecting 
internet users, would lessen user control over what 
information they receive, contrary to Congress’s 
stated policy. See § 230(b)(3) (to maximize user 
control over what content they view). Indeed, users 
selecting a security software provider must trust 
that the provider will block material consistent with 
that user’s desires. Users would not reasonably 
anticipate providers blocking valuable online content 
in order to stifle competition. Immunizing 
anticompetitive blocking would, therefore, be 
contrary to another of the statute’s express policies: 
“removing disincentives for the utilization of blocking 
and filtering technologies.” Id. § 230(b)(4). 
We therefore reject Malwarebytes’s position that  
§ 230 immunity applies regardless of anticompetitive 
purpose. But we cannot, as Enigma asks us to do, 
ignore the breadth of the term “objectionable” by 
construing it to cover only material that is sexual or 
violent in nature. Enigma would have us read the 
general, catchall phrase “otherwise objectionable” as 
limited to the categories of online material described 
in the seven specific categories that precede it. See 47 
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U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (describing material that is 
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing or otherwise objectionable.”). Enigma 
argues that its software has no such content, and 
that Malwarebytes therefore cannot claim immunity 
for blocking it. 
Enigma relies on the principle of ejusdem generis, 
which teaches that when a generic term follows 
specific terms, the generic term should be construed 
to reference subjects akin to those with the specific 
enumeration. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. 
Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991). 
But the specific categories listed in § 230(c)(2) vary 
greatly: Material that is lewd or lascivious is not 
necessarily similar to material that is violent, or 
material that is harassing. If the enumerated 
categories are not similar, they provide little or no 
assistance in interpreting the more general category. 
We have previously recognized this concept. See 
Sacramento Reg’l Cty. Sanitation Dist. v. Reilly, 905 
F.2d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Where the list of 
objects that precedes the ‘or other’ phrase is 
dissimilar, ejusdem generis does not apply”). 
We think that the catchall was more likely 
intended to encapsulate forms of unwanted online 
content that Congress could not identify in the 
1990s. But even if ejusdem generis did apply, it 
would not support Enigma’s narrow interpretation of 
“otherwise objectionable.” Congress wanted to give 
internet users tools to avoid not only violent or 
sexually explicit materials, but also harassing 
materials. Spam, malware and adware could fairly 
be placed close enough to harassing materials to at 
least be called “otherwise objectionable” while still 
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being faithful to the principle of ejusdem generis. 
Several district courts have, for example, regarded 
unsolicited marketing emails as “objectionable.” See, 
e.g., Holomaxx, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1104; e360Insight, 
LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608-610 
(N.D. Ill. 2008); see also Smith v. Trusted Universal 
Standards In Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. CIV09-
4567-RBK-KMW, 2010 WL 1799456, at *6 (D.N.J. 
May 4, 2010). But we do not, in this appeal, 
determine the precise relationship between the term 
“otherwise objectionable” and the seven categories 
that precede it. We conclude only that if a provider’s 
basis for objecting to and seeking to block materials 
is because those materials benefit a competitor, the 
objection would not fall within any category listed in 
the statute and the immunity would not apply. 
Malwarebytes’s fallback position is that, even if it 
would lack immunity for anticompetitive blocking, 
Malwarebytes has found Enigma’s programs 
“objectionable” for legitimate reasons based on the 
programs’ content. Malwarebytes asserts that 
Enigma’s programs, SpyHunter and RegHunter, use 
“deceptive tactics” to scare users into believing that 
they have to download Enigma’s programs to prevent 
their computers from being infected. Enigma alleges, 
however, that its programs “pose no security threat” 
and that Malwarebytes’s justification for blocking 
these “legitimate” and “highly regarded” programs 
was a guise for anticompetitive animus. 
The district court interpreted our holding in Zango 
to foreclose this debate entirely, implicitly reasoning 
that if Malwarebytes has sole discretion to select 
what programs are “objectionable,” the court need 
not evaluate the reasons for the designation. Because 
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we hold that § 230 does not provide immunity for 
blocking a competitor’s program for anticompetitive 
reasons, and because Enigma has specifically alleged 
that the blocking here was anticompetitive, Enigma’s 
claims survive the motion to dismiss. We therefore 
reverse the dismissal of Enigma’s state-law claims 
and we remand for further proceedings. 
II.  The Federal Claim and the CDA’s 
Intellectual Property Exception 
Enigma’s fourth claim is a claim for false 
advertising under the Lanham Act, a statute dealing 
with a form of intellectual property, i.e. trademarks. 
Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes publicly 
mischaracterized Enigma’s programs SpyHunter and 
RegHunter as potentially unwanted or PUPs, and it 
did so in order to interfere with Enigma’s customer 
base and divert those customers to Malwarebytes. 
Section 230(e)(2) of the CDA contains an exception 
to immunity for intellectual property claims. See 47 
U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). This exception, known as the 
intellectual property carve out, states that § 230 
immunity shall not “limit or expand any law 
pertaining to intellectual property.” Id. In light of 
that exception, Enigma contends that immunity 
would not bar Enigma’s Lanham Act claim, even if 
immunity is available to Malwarebytes on the state 
law claims. Although Enigma’s claim does not itself 
involve an intellectual property right, Enigma 
characterizes its federal false advertising claim as 
one “pertaining to intellectual property” within the 
meaning of § 230(e)(2) because the Lanham Act deals 
with intellectual property. The district court rejected 
this argument, and rightly so. 
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This is because even though the Lanham Act is 
known as the federal trademark statute, not all 
claims brought under the statute involve 
trademarks. The Act contains two parts, one 
governing trademark infringement and another 
governing false designations of origin, false 
descriptions, and dilution. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1114 
(trademark infringement) with id. § 1125 (the rest). 
The latter, § 1125, creates two bases of liability, false 
association and false advertising. Compare § 1125 
(a)(1)(A) (false association) with § 1125 (a)(1)(B)
(false advertising). Thus, although “much of the 
Lanham Act addresses the registration, use, and 
infringement of trademarks and related marks, . . .  
§ 1125(a) is one of the few provisions that goes 
beyond trademark protection.” Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28-29 
(2003). 
In this appeal, we must decide whether the 
exception to immunity contained in § 230(e)(2) 
applies to false advertising claims brought under the 
Lanham Act. Our court has not addressed the issue, 
although we have considered the exception as it 
would apply to state law claims. See Perfect 10 v. 
CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(concluding that the intellectual property exception 
in § 230(e)(2) was not intended to cover intellectual 
property claims brought under state law); see also 
Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, L.L.C. v. Chumley, 840 
F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2016) (declining to 
analyze the intellectual property exception; 
explaining that because “§ 230 does not contain the 
grant of immunity from suit contended for, it is 
unnecessary to discuss its applicability to the 
Lanham Act false advertising claims”). 
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We have observed before that because Congress did 
not define the term “intellectual property law,” it 
should be construed narrowly to advance the CDA’s 
express policy of providing broad immunity See 
Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119. One of these express 
policy reasons for providing immunity was, as 
Congress stated in § 230(b)(2), “to preserve the 
vibrant and competitive free market that presently 
exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). The intellectual 
property exception is a limitation on immunity, and 
the CDA’s stated congressional purpose counsels 
against an expansive interpretation of the exception 
that would diminish the scope of immunity If the 
intellectual property law exception were to 
encompass any claim raised under the Lanham Act—
including false advertising claims that do not directly 
involve intellectual property rights—it would create 
a potential for new liability that would upset, rather 
than “preserve” the vibrant culture of innovation on 
the internet that Congress envisioned. Id.
We therefore hold that the intellectual property 
exception contained in § 230(e)(2) encompasses 
claims pertaining to an established intellectual 
property right under federal law, like those inherent 
in a patent, copyright, or trademark. The exception 
does not apply to false advertising claims brought 
under § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, unless the claim 
itself involves intellectual property. 
Here, Enigma’s Lanham Act claim derives from the 
statute’s false advertising provision. Enigma alleges 
that Malwarebytes mischaracterized Enigma’s most 
popular software programs in order to divert 
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Enigma’s customers to Malwarebytes. These 
allegations do not relate to or involve trademark 
rights or any other intellectual property rights. Thus, 
Enigma’s false advertising claim is not a claim 
“pertaining to intellectual property law” within the 
meaning of § 230(e)(2). The district court correctly 
concluded that the intellectual property exception to 
immunity does not encompass Enigma’s Lanham Act 
claim. 
The district court went on to hold, however, as it 
did with the state law claims, that Malwarebytes is 
nevertheless immune from liability under our 
decision in Zango. As we have explained with respect 
to the state law claims, Zango did not define an 
unlimited scope of immunity under § 230, and 
immunity under that section does not extend to 
anticompetitive conduct. Because the federal claim, 
like the state claims, is based on allegations of such 
conduct, the federal claim survives dismissal. We 
therefore reverse the district court’s judgment in 
favor of Malwarebytes and remand for further 
proceedings on this claim as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the district court is reversed and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
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RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
In his concurring opinion in Zango, Inc. v. 
Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 
2009), Judge Fisher acknowledged that “until 
Congress clarifies the statute or a future litigant 
makes the case for a possible limitation,” the 
“broadly worded” Communications Decency Act (the 
Act) afforded immunity to a distributor of Internet 
security software. Congress has not further clarified 
the statute and Enigma Software has not 
persuasively made a case for limitation of the statute 
beyond its provisions. 
The majority opinion seeks to limit the statute 
based on the fact that the parties are competitors. 
See Majority Opinion, p. 4. However, nothing in the 
statutory provisions or our majority opinion in Zango 
supports such a distinction. Rather the “broad 
language” of the Act specifically encompasses “any 
action voluntarily taken [by a provider] to restrict 
access to . . . material that the provider . . . considers 
to be . . . otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Under the language 
of the Act, so long as the provider’s action is taken to 
remove “otherwise objectionable” material, the 
restriction of access is immunized. See id. The 
majority’s real complaint is not that the district court 
construed the statute too broadly, but that the 
statute is written too broadly. However, that defect, 
if it is a defect, is one beyond our authority to correct. 
See Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 
2158, 2169 (2015). 
In particular, the majority holds that the criteria 
for blocking online material may not be based on the 
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identity of the entity that produced it. See Majority 
Opinion, p. 10. Unfortunately, however, that 
conclusion cannot be squared with the broad 
language of the Act. Under the language of the 
statute, if the blocked content is “otherwise 
objectionable” to the provider, the Act bestows 
immunity. Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173 (“[T]he statute 
plainly immunizes from suit a provider of interactive 
computer services that makes available software 
that filters or screens material that the user or the 
provider deems objectionable.”) (emphasis in the 
original); 1174 (“According protection to providers of 
programs that filter adware and malware is also 
consistent with the Congressional goals for immunity 
articulated in [47 U.S.C.] § 230 itself.”). Although the 
parties were not direct competitors, the plaintiff in 
Zango asserted similar anti-competition effects. See 
id. at 1171-72. The majority’s policy arguments are 
in conflict with our recognition in Zango that the 
broad language of the Act is consistent with “the 
Congressional goals for immunity” as expressed in 
the language of the statute. Id. at 1174. As the 
district court cogently noted, we “must presume that 
a legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut 
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) 
(citations omitted). 
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Plaintiff Enigma Software Group USA LLC 
(“Enigma”) brings claims against Defendant 
Malwarebytes Inc. based on its allegation that 
Malwarebytes unlawfully characterized Enigma’s 
software as harmful to users’ computers. 
Malwarebytes now moves to dismiss under Fed. R. 




Malwarebytes develops software that protects 
internet users from malware, adware, and other 
unwanted computer programs. First Am. Compl. 
(“FAC”) ¶¶ 3, 36, Dkt. No. 33. Malwarebytes’s 
software scans users’ computers for “potentially 
unwanted programs,” which it automatically flags 
and quarantines. Id. ¶ 5. When the software detects 
an unwanted program, it displays a notification and 
asks the user if she wants to remove the program 
from her computer. Id. 
Enigma also provides anti-malware software to 
internet users. Id. ¶ 4. Enigma alleges that, in 2016, 
Malwarebytes revised the criteria it uses to identify 
unwanted programs. Id. ¶ 7. Under the new criteria, 
Malwarebytes’s software identifies Enigma’s 
software as a potential threat. Id.  Enigma alleges 
that Malwarebytes’s classification of Enigma’s 
software is wrong because Enigma’s programs “are 
legitimate and pose no security threat to users’ 
computers.” Id. ¶ 9. Enigma alleges that 
Malwarebytes revised its criteria to interfere with 
Enigma’s customer base and to retaliate against 
Enigma for a separate lawsuit Enigma filed against 
a Malwarebytes affiliate. Id. ¶¶ 8, 19–20. 
On that basis, Enigma brings claims for (1) false 
advertising in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
(FAC ¶¶ 134–43), (2) violations of New York General 
Business Law § 3491 (FAC ¶¶ 144–50), (3) tortious 
interference with contractual relations (FAC ¶¶ 151–
1 This case was transferred from the Southern District of New 
York on May 12, 2017. Dkt. No. 67. 
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160), and (4) tortious interference with business 
relations (FAC ¶¶ 161–68). 
Malwarebytes now moves to dismiss under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”), Dkt. 
No. 97. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
tests the legal sufficiency of claims alleged in the 
complaint. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 
F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Dismissal “is proper 
only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an 
absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a 
cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 
729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The complaint “must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Malwarebytes argues that all of Enigma’s claims 
are barred by the immunity provisions of § 230(c)(2) 
of the Communications Decency Act. Mot. 7. That 
section provides: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good 
faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers 
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
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objectionable, whether or not such material 
is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make 
available to information content providers 
or others the technical means to restrict 
access to material described in paragraph 
(1). 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). Congress enacted these 
provisions “to encourage the development of 
technologies which maximize user control over what 
information is received by individuals, families, and 
schools who use the Internet,” and to encourage 
“development and utilization of blocking and filtering 
technologies.” Id. § 230(b)(3), (4). 
Malwarebytes argues that this case is 
“indistinguishable” from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
in Zango interpreting § 230(c)(2). Mot. 8; Zango, Inc. 
v. Kaspersky, 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009). In that 
case, Zango alleged that Kaspersky’s anti-malware 
software incorrectly classified Zango’s software as 
harmful. Zango, 568 F.3d at 1170–71. The Ninth 
Circuit considered whether “companies that provide 
filtering tools,” such as Kaspersky, are eligible for 
immunity under § 230(c). Id. at 1173. The panel first 
explained that providers of blocking software are 
eligible for § 230(c)(2) immunity as long as they meet 
the statutory requirements. Id. at 1173–75. Next, it 
found that Kaspersky was an “interactive computer 
service” within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 
1175–76. It also found that Kaspersky “has ‘made 
available’ for its users the technical means to restrict 
items that Kaspersky has defined as malware.” Id. at 
1176. The panel found that Kaspersky qualified for 
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immunity under § 230(c)(2)(B) “so long as the 
blocked items are objectionable material under  
§ 230(c)(2)(A).” Id. It concluded that Kaspersky 
properly classified malware as “objectionable” 
material, and as such, it found that Kaspersky 
satisfied the requirements for immunity under  
§ 230(c)(2)(B). Id. at 1177–78 (holding that any 
“provider of access tools that filter, screen, allow, or 
disallow content that the provider or user considers 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable is protected 
from liability by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) for any 
action taken to make available to others the 
technical means to restrict access to that material”). 
Enigma argues that Zango is distinguishable in 
two respects. First, Enigma argues that malware, as 
defined by Malwarebytes’s criteria, is not one of the 
types of materials to which § 230(c)(2) immunity 
applies. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 
(“Opp’n”) 11–12, 14, Dkt. No. 100. By its terms,  
§ 230(c)(2)(A) applies to material that is “obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” § 230(c)(2)(B) 
applies to the same material.2 Enigma argues that 
malware is not within the scope of “objectionable” 
material because it is “not remotely related to the 
content categories enumerated” in subsection (A) 
(i.e., materials that are “obscene, lewd, lascivious,” 
and so on). Opp’n 10. Enigma further argues that 
2 Subsection (B) refers to “material described in paragraph 
(1).” This is a typo in the statute; it should read: “material 
described in paragraph (A).” See Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173 n.5 
(“ ‘paragraph (1)’ is a scrivener’s error referring to ‘paragraph 
(A)’ ”). 
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Zango did not address whether an anti-malware 
provider has discretion to decide what is 
“objectionable,” because, as the Ninth Circuit noted, 
Zango waived that argument by failing to raise it in 
its opening appellate brief. Id.; Zango, 568 F.3d at 
1175–76. 
However, while it is true that the Zango panel 
found that Zango waived this argument, Enigma 
overlooks Zango’s clear holding that § 230(c)(2)(B) 
immunity applies to “a provider of computer services 
that makes available software that filters or screens 
material that the user or the provider deems 
objectionable.” Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173 (emphasis in 
original); see also id. at 1177 (holding that immunity 
applies to material “that the provider or user 
considers . . . objectionable”) (emphasis added); id. 
(immunity applies to “material that either the user 
or the provider deems objectionable”) (emphasis in 
original). This interpretation of Zango aligns with 
the plain language of the statute, which likewise 
states that immunity applies to “material that the 
provider or user considers to be . . . objectionable.” 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). In Zango, the 
provider of the anti-malware software, Kaspersky, 
exercised its discretion to select the criteria it would 
use to identify objectionable computer programs. The 
Ninth Circuit held that malware, as Kaspersky 
defined it, was properly within the scope of 
“objectionable” material. In that respect, the Court 
agrees with Malwarebytes that Zango is factually 
indistinguishable from the scenario here. 
Second, Enigma argues that Malwarebytes is 
entitled to § 230(c)(2)(B) immunity only if it acted in 
“good faith.” Opp’n 11–14. Subsection (A) protects 
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“any action voluntarily taken in good faith” to 
restrict access to objectionable material (emphasis 
added). Subsection (B) does not contain a good-faith 
requirement. Nonetheless, Enigma argues that good 
faith is “an implied requirement in subsection (B) 
that is part and parcel of the proper, plain meaning 
of the statute when read as a whole.” Opp’n 14. The 
Zango court did not decide whether subsection (B) 
contains a good-faith requirement, since Zango 
waived that argument on appeal and the panel did 
not need to resolve it to reach its decision. Zango, 568 
F.3d at 1177. However, as the panel recognized, 
subsection (B) “has no good faith language.” Id. Here, 
the Court must assume that Congress acted 
intentionally when it decided to include a good-faith 
requirement in subsection (A) but not in (B). See, 
e.g., Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 
253–54 (1992) (“[I]n interpreting a statute a court 
should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before 
all others. We have stated time and again that courts 
must presume that a legislature says in a statute 
what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there.”); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 
(1995) (“The difference between the two provisions 
demonstrates that, had Congress meant to broaden 
application of the statute . . . , Congress could and 
would have so specified.”). This reading is bolstered 
by the fact that subsection (B) includes an explicit 
reference to subsection (A) with respect to the types 
of material to which immunity applies. Congress 
could have included a similar reference in subection 
(B) to subsection (A)’s good-faith requirement, but it 
chose not to. As such, the Court agrees with 
Malwarebytes that it need not consider whether 
Malwarebytes acted in good faith for the purposes of 
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deciding whether Malwarebytes is entitled to 
immunity under § 230(c)(2)(B). Def.’s Reply in 
Support of Mot. to Dismiss (“Reply”) 5–7, Dkt. No. 
102. 
Enigma argues Malwarebytes is nonetheless 
ineligible for immunity with respect to Enigma’s 
Lanham Act claim (FAC ¶¶ 134–143) because § 230 
provides that “nothing in [§ 230] shall be construed 
to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual 
property.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2); Opp’n 15.3 Enigma’s 
argument fails because its complaint does not allege 
an intellectual property claim. The Lanham Act 
contains two parts: one governing trademark 
infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114) and one governing 
unfair competition (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). The unfair 
competition provision, in turn, “creates two distinct 
bases of liability”: one governing false association (15 
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)) and one governing false 
advertising (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B)). Lexmark 
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1377, 1384 (2014). Enigma’s complaint asserts a 
false advertising claim under § 1125(a)(1)(B). FAC 
¶ 135. Enigma does not assert claims under the 
trademark provisions of the Lanham Act. The 
complaint does not allege that Enigma owns 
trademarks or any other form of intellectual 
property, nor does it allege that Malwarebytes has 
committed any form of intellectual property 
infringement, including misuse of its trademarks. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that Enigma’s false 
3 Enigma does not dispute that immunity would apply to its 
other three claims for business torts. Opp’n 15; see also Zango, 
568 F.3d at 1177 (“we have interpreted § 230 immunity to cover 
business torts”). 
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advertising claim under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a)(1)(B), does not arise under a “law pertaining 
to intellectual property” under 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). 
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 
1077, 1109–10 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Since false 
advertising . . . does not pertain to intellectual 
property rights, the Court finds that the immunity 
provided under the CDA for [the plaintiff’s] false 
advertising claim is not excluded under § 230(e)(2).”). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because Malwarebytes is entitled to immunity 
under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) with respect to all of 
Enigma’s claims, Malwarebytes’s motion to dismiss 
is GRANTED. The Clerk shall close this file. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: November 7, 2017 
/s/ 
EDWARD J. DAVILA  




STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
_________ 
1.  47 U.S.C. § 230 provides:  
Protection for private blocking and screening 
of offensive material
(a) Findings 
The Congress finds the following: 
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and 
other interactive computer services available to 
individual Americans represent an extraordinary 
advance in the availability of educational and 
informational resources to our citizens. 
(2) These services offer users a great degree of 
control over the information that they receive, as 
well as the potential for even greater control in the 
future as technology develops. 
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer 
services offer a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual 
activity. 
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer 
services have flourished, to the benefit of all 
Americans, with a minimum of government 
regulation. 
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on 
interactive media for a variety of political, 
educational, cultural, and entertainment services. 
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(b) Policy 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to promote the continued development of the 
Internet and other interactive computer services and 
other interactive media; 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation; 
(3) to encourage the development of technologies 
which maximize user control over what information 
is received by individuals, families, and schools who 
use the Internet and other interactive computer 
services; 
(4) to remove disincentives for the development 
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies 
that empower parents to restrict their children’s 
access to objectionable or inappropriate online 
material; and 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal 
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in 
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer. 
(c) Protection for ‘‘Good Samaritan’’ blocking 
and screening of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker  
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of any information provided by another information 
content provider. 
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(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available 
to information content providers or others the 
technical means to restrict access to material 
described in paragraph (1).1
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service  
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at 
the time of entering an agreement with a customer 
for the provision of interactive computer service and 
in a manner deemed appropriate by the provider, 
notify such customer that parental control 
protections (such as computer hardware, software, or 
filtering services) are commercially available that 
may assist the customer in limiting access to 
material that is harmful to minors. Such notice shall 
identify, or provide the customer with access to 
information identifying, current providers of such 
protections. 
(e) Effect on other laws 
(1) No effect on criminal law 
1 So in original.  Probably should be “subparagraph (A).” 
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Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair 
the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, 
chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to 
sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any 
other Federal criminal statute. 
(2) No effect on intellectual property law  
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit 
or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property. 
(3) State law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
prevent any State from enforcing any State law that 
is consistent with this section. No cause of action 
may be brought and no liability may be imposed 
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with 
this section. 
(4) No effect on communications privacy law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit 
the application of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments made 
by such Act, or any similar State law. 
(5) No effect on sex trafficking law 
Nothing in this section (other than subsection 
(c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or limit— 
(A) any claim in a civil action brought under 
section 1595 of title 18, if the conduct underlying 
the claim constitutes a violation of section 1591 of 
that title; 
(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought 
under State law if the conduct underlying the 
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charge would constitute a violation of section 1591 
of title 18; or 
(C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought 
under State law if the conduct underlying the 
charge would constitute a violation of section 
2421A of title 18, and promotion or facilitation of 
prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the 
defendant’s promotion or facilitation of prostitution 
was targeted. 
(f) Definitions 
As used in this section: 
(1) Internet 
The term ‘‘Internet’’ means the international 
computer network of both Federal and non-Federal 
interoperable packet switched data networks. 
(2) Interactive computer service 
The term ‘‘interactive computer service’’ means any 
information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access 
to the Internet and such systems operated or 
services offered by libraries or educational 
institutions. 
(3) Information content provider 
The term ‘‘information content provider’’ means 
any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or 
in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any 
other interactive computer service. 
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(4) Access software provider 
The term ‘‘access software provider’’ means a 
provider of software (including client or server 
software), or enabling tools that do any one or more 
of the following: 
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content; 
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or 
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, 
search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate 
content. 
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2.  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012) provides:  
Protection for private blocking and screening 
of offensive material
a) Findings 
The Congress finds the following: 
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and 
other interactive computer services available to 
individual Americans represent an extraordinary 
advance in the availability of educational and 
informational resources to our citizens. 
(2) These services offer users a great degree of 
control over the information that they receive, as 
well as the potential for even greater control in the 
future as technology develops. 
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer 
services offer a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual 
activity. 
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer 
services have flourished, to the benefit of all 
Americans, with a minimum of government 
regulation. 
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on 
interactive media for a variety of political, 
educational, cultural, and entertainment services. 
(b) Policy 
It is the policy of the United States— 
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(1) to promote the continued development of the 
Internet and other interactive computer services and 
other interactive media; 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation; 
(3) to encourage the development of technologies 
which maximize user control over what information 
is received by individuals, families, and schools who 
use the Internet and other interactive computer 
services; 
(4) to remove disincentives for the development 
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies 
that empower parents to restrict their children’s 
access to objectionable or inappropriate online 
material; and 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal 
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in 
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer. 
(c) Protection for ‘‘Good Samaritan’’ blocking 
and screening of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of any information provided by another information 
content provider. 
(2) Civil liability 
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No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available 
to information content providers or others the 
technical means to restrict access to material 
described in paragraph (1).1
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service 
A provider of interactive computer service shall, 
at the time of entering an agreement with a 
customer for the provision of interactive computer 
service and in a manner deemed appropriate by the 
provider, notify such customer that parental 
control protections (such as computer hardware, 
software, or filtering services) are commercially 
available that may assist the customer in limiting 
access to material that is harmful to minors. Such 
notice shall identify, or provide the customer with 
access to information identifying, current providers 
of such protections. 
(e) Effect on other laws 
(1) No effect on criminal law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of 
1 So in original. Probably should be “subparagraph (A).” 
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this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 
18, or any other Federal criminal statute. 
(2) No effect on intellectual property law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual 
property. 
(3) State law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
prevent any State from enforcing any State law 
that is consistent with this section. No cause of 
action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section. 
(4) No effect on communications privacy law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
limit the application of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the 
amendments made by such Act, or any similar 
State law. 
(f) Definitions 
As used in this section: 
(1) Internet 
The term ‘‘Internet’’ means the international 
computer network of both Federal and non-
Federal interoperable packet switched data 
networks. 
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(2) Interactive computer service 
The term ‘‘interactive computer service’’ means 
any information service, system, or access 
software provider that provides or enables 
computer access by multiple users to a computer 
server, including specifically a service or system 
that provides access to the Internet and such 
systems operated or services offered by libraries 
or educational institutions. 
(3) Information content provider 
The term ‘‘information content provider’’ means 
any person or entity that is responsible, in whole 
or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any 
other interactive computer service. 
(4) Access software provider 
The term ‘‘access software provider’’ means a 
provider of software (including client or server 
software), or enabling tools that do any one or 
more of the following: 
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content; 
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or 
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, 
search, subset, organize, reorganize, or 
translate content. 
